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Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of
Institutional Reform Litigation
Jason Parkin*
Institutional reform litigation has been an enduring feature of the
American legal system since the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education.
The resulting injunctions have transformed countless
bureaucraciesnotorious for resisting change, including public school systems,
housing authorities, social services agencies, correctionalfacilities, and police
departments. But these injunctions face an uncertain future. The Supreme
Court has held that institutional reform injunctions must be easier to
terminate than all other injunctions issued by the federal courts. Some
institutionalreform injunctions go unenforced or are forgotten entirely. Others
expire due to sunset provisions. At the same time, doctrinalshifts have made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to win new injunctions in institutional reform
cases.
Scholars have been tracing the decline of institutional reform
litigation for years, but little attention has been paid to the fate of the
countless injunctions that remain in place. This Article sheds light on this
essential but overlooked aspect of institutional reform litigation. First, it
identifies three ways that institutional reform injunctions are dying off-by
dissolution, by design, and by disuse-and the implications of each form of
injunction death. Then, it argues that scholars, judges, and litigants must
rethink their approach to the end stages of institutional reform injunctions,
offering strategies to ensure that current and future injunctions are not
terminatedprematurely. This Article thus adds an important new perspective
to the debate over the legacy of institutionalreform litigation.
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INTRODUCTION

What will become of aging institutional reform injunctions?
Sixty years have now passed since the Supreme Court first endorsed
the notion that courts could order system-wide reforms intended to
bring government agencies into compliance with the law.' During that
time, institutional reform litigation has transformed countless
bureaucracies notorious for resisting change, including public school
systems, social services agencies, correctional facilities, housing
authorities, and police departments. 2 The injunctions that result from
1.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11).
2.
See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1021-52 (2004) (tracing the history of institutional
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these lawsuits comprise a body of binding, enforceable obligations that
supplement the rights and requirements created by constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory law. As time passes, however, how long
these injunctions will remain in force is far from clear.
Although institutional reform litigation has been the subject of
much legal scholarship, comparatively little attention has been paid to
how its remedial phase should come to an end. As this novel form of
litigation rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, it sparked
heated debates among scholars. The cases were controversial from the
beginning, as they involved judges (usually federal) compelling
government agencies (usually state and local) to honor the rights
(usually federal) of individuals who interact with those agencies. Its
proponents viewed institutional reform litigation as an important tool
for ensuring that governmental entities comply with the law, 3 while
critics objected on federalism, separation of powers, and judicial
legitimacy and capacity grounds. 4 More recently, public law scholars
have shifted their focus to the increasingly hostile terrain facing
plaintiffs bringing new lawsuits challenging governmental policies
and practices. Aside from law review articles commenting on the
winding down of school desegregation remedies, 5 the fate of existing
institutional reform injunctions has been largely ignored. 6

reform remedies, with particular attention to litigation involving education, mental health
services, prisons, police, and housing).
Leading scholars such as Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss provided crucial early support.
3.
See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]; OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
INJUNCTION (1978) [hereinafter FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION]. Their work, as well as the

work of other proponents of institutional reform litigation, is discussed in Part I, infra.
4.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 19; William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Michael W.
McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political
Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295; Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).
For more contemporary critiques of institutional reform litigation, see, for example, ROSS
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN
GOVERNMENT (2003) [hereinafter SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE]; Michael T.

Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent
Decrees in Government-DefendantCases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014); Ross Sandler & David
Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and InstitutionalReform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 915 (2005) [hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme Court]; and John Choon Yoo,
Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1121 (1996).
5.
See, e.g., David I. Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The
Course of InstitutionalReform Cases After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
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Unlike academics, the litigants and judges involved with
institutional reform litigation do not have the luxury of ignoring
questions related to the end stages of these injunctions. Although the
Supreme Court has rarely addressed when and how institutional
reform injunctions should conclude, its most recent ruling on this
topic-the 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores-emphasized that
institutional reform injunctions must be easier to terminate than all
other types of injunctions.7 In response, government defendants have
moved aggressively to overturn or dissolve long-standing injunctions.8
This has altered the dynamic of institutional reform litigation in
recent years, as previously victorious plaintiffs are finding themselves
on the defensive, fighting to preserve remedies won at earlier stages of
the litigation.9
But government motions to terminate injunctions represent
only part of the story when it comes to the death of institutional
reform injunctions. The remedies are also coming to an end in two less
visible-but no less important-ways. First, institutional reform
injunctions are terminating according to their own design. 10 An
institutional reform injunction can be written so that it applies in
perpetuity, or it can specify the terms of its demise in a termination or
"sunset" provision. Such provisions are typically triggered by the
passage of a specified period of time or by the defendant's satisfaction
of performance benchmarks. Whether bargained for by parties as part
of a consent decree or inserted by judges fashioning a litigated
remedial order, these provisions have become common as defendants
and judges seek to avoid long-term court oversight and enforcement of
institutional reform injunctions.
Second, institutional reform injunctions are terminating due to
disuse." Even when institutional reform injunctions are in effect on
paper, they remain viable only as long as the parties and the court
579 (1993); Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of
Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283 (2002).
Two recent exceptions do not address the broader issues considered by this Article. See
6.
Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand the Future
of InstitutionalReform LitigationAfter Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435 (2013); Mark
Kelley, Note, Saving 60(b)(5): The Future of Institutional Reform Litigation, 125 YALE L.J. 272
(2015).
7.
557 U.S. 433 (2009). The Horne decision relied, in part, on earlier Supreme Court
rulings that expressed growing skepticism of institutional reform litigation. See Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Bd. of
Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
8.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
9.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11.
See infra Part II.C.
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continue to implement and enforce them. For injunctions issued five,
ten, twenty, thirty, or even forty years ago, this can be quite a difficult
task. The plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and judges involved in the
litigation all must exit the case eventually (whether because of
relocation, retirement, death, or other reasons), creating a need for
new participants to ensure that the injunction is not ignored or
forgotten. In addition, the circumstances of the underlying legal
violations may evolve over time in ways that create a mismatch
between the terms of the injunction and the problem it was intended
to remedy. These changes do not necessarily mean that aging
injunctions should be discarded; to the contrary, the proper response
may be to update rather than cast aside the injunction. But when an
injunction falls into disuse, for whatever reason, it may effectively
terminate even though the injunction otherwise remains a valid court
order.
Taken together, these three forms of injunction death-by
dissolution, by design, and by disuse-show that the end stage of
institutional reform litigation is more complex and less visible than
suggested by court decisions and law review articles. Litigated
injunctions are not as permanent as they once seemed-even when
they are labeled "permanent injunctions" by the court. Similarly, the
stability of consent decrees negotiated by plaintiffs and defendants,
and overseen by judges, is also in doubt, either because defendants are,
demanding the inclusion of sunset provisions or they are filing
motions to terminate the decrees. In sum, regardless of the cause, the
lifespan of institutional reform injunctions is shortening in ways that
have escaped attention thus far.
This shift has important implications for the plaintiffs,
defendants, lawyers, and judges involved in institutional reform
litigation. Termination of an institutional reform injunction threatens
to result in rights violations that go unaddressed. This could occur
because the injunction ends before the defendant has fully remedied
the underlying unlawful activity, or because violations that had
ceased begin again after the injunction is dissolved. To be sure, such
undesirable outcomes are not automatic; however, the shift toward
earlier termination of institutional reform injunctions increases the
likelihood that an injunction will be terminated before its objectives
have been met.
Sooner-than-expected
termination can also upset the
expectations of the parties and judges who designed the injunctions.
Effective institutional reform takes time, and institutional reform
injunctions often call for remedial measures and performance
improvements that require years, if not decades, to be achieved.

172

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1:167

Particularly for older injunctions, it is likely that the drafters assumed
that the injunctions would remain in force for many years. But now,
with the lifespan of injunctions shortening, those injunctions may not
last long enough for their provisions to be implemented as intended.
Reducing the duration of injunctions also adds uncertainty and
cost to the process of institutional reform. At the most basic level, it
undermines one of the goals of institutional reform injunctions: to
create a stable set of requirements and expectations for government
institutions that have failed to comply with the law. But if the
requirements and expectations established by an injunction are
perceived to be merely temporary, true systemic reform is harder to
achieve. The perception that institutional reform injunctions are
susceptible to termination can also consume litigation and judicial
resources, with parties litigating, and courts ruling on, more frequent
motions to terminate injunctions as well as new lawsuits challenging
violations that were targeted by injunctions that have been
terminated.
When considering the fate of aging institutional reform
injunctions, it is important to note that just because an injunction has
been in place for years without full compliance does not necessarily
mean that it is outdated or ineffectual. Long-standing injunctions can
be the source of ongoing, vigorous monitoring and enforcement efforts
aimed at bringing a recalcitrant defendant into compliance with the
law. Decades-old injunctions aimed at reforming New York City's
public schools 12 and New Jersey's child welfare system provide two
examples. 13 Those injunctions went into effect in 1979 and 2003,
respectively, and they continue to influence the day-to-day operation
of vital government agencies.
But even injunctions that have prompted the intended reforms
are not necessarily ready for the scrap heap. A vivid illustration is
provided by the Flores v. Reno consent decree, which established
minimum standards for the treatment of minor children in the custody
of immigration officials. 14 The district court approved the consent
12. See Judgment, Jose P. v. Ambach, No. 79 Civ. 270 (EHN) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979). This
injunction has been modified and supplemented since 1979. See, e.g., Stipulation, Jose P. v.
Sobol, No. 79 Civ. 270 (EHN) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1988).
13. See Settlement Agreement, Charlie & Nadine H. v. McGreevey, Civ. Action No. 99-3678
(SRC) (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2003). This injunction was modified in 2008. Modified Settlement
Agreement, Charlie & Nadine H. v. Corzine, Civ. Action No. 99-3678 (SRC) (D.N.J. July 18,
2006).
14. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). The lawsuit was initially filed as Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px)
(C.D. Cal. July 11, 1985), but Attorney General Janet Reno had been substituted as the lead
defendant by the time it settled.
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decree in 1997, and the government complied with its terms for many
years. Although there were times when it appeared to be just another
old injunction that had outlived its purpose and fallen into disuse, the
Flores decree has been called into action twice during its lifespan. 15 In
2007, a group of children challenged their confinement in a Texas
facility that failed to comply with the consent decree's terms, 16 and, in
2015, the Flores class returned to court to enforce the decree on behalf
of children detained after fleeing violence in Central America.17 Both
actions were resolved in the plaintiffs' favor, with the government
agreeing or being ordered to adjust its policies in accordance with the
original Flores consent decree.18
As these and other examples demonstrate, the story of
institutional reform litigation is incomplete without an accounting of
how institutional reform injunctions come to an end. Yet while this is
becoming increasingly apparent as more injunctions are terminated, it
has been obscured by other shifts in the doctrinal landscape occupied
by institutional reform litigation. Recent Supreme Court decisions
related to standing, class-action standards, private rights of action,
and the scope of injunctions, all make it harder for plaintiffs seeking
institutional reform to win system-wide relief.1 9 While important,
those developments affect the ability of new plaintiffs to obtain new
injunctions. The future of institutional reform litigation surely will
depend on what happens in lawsuits that have not yet been broughtbut the fate of countless existing injunctions is an essential part of
that future as well.
Considering the end stages of institutional reform injunctions
raises difficult normative questions. It can be tempting to adopt
across-the-board rules limiting the lifespan of these injunctions to a
15. A 2001 amendment to the consent decree added a termination provision, but the
conditions of that provision have not been satisfied and the decree remains in force. Stipulation
and Order, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2001) ("All terms of this
agreement shall terminate 45 days following defendants' publication of final regulations
implementing this Agreement.").
16. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, In re Hutto Family Detention Ctr., No.
A-07-CA-164-SS (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2007).
17. See Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action, Flores v. Johnson, No. CV 85-4544
RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015).
18. Settlement Agreement, In re Hutto Family Detention Ctr., No. A-07-CA-164-SS (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 26, 2007); Flores v. Johnson, No. CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015)
(granting plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement and denying defendants' motion to amend
settlement agreement), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th
Cir. 2016). The government's compliance with the most recent Flores remedial order is in
dispute. See Motion to Enforce Settlement and Appoint a Special Monitor, Flores v. Lynch, No.
CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016).
19. See infra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
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specified period of time. Indeed, Congress enacted such temporal
limitations in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"),
which mandates that injunctions in prison-conditions lawsuits
terminate within two years unless the court makes certain findings. 20
And, more recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed bills
seeking to extend similar limitations to all consent decrees that bind
state and local government officials. 2 1 This Article questions whether
such bright-line limitations are desirable in the institutional reform
litigation context. It looks instead for approaches that link the
duration of injunctions to the government's ability to remedy the
underlying violations.
The tension between permanent and temporary legal
obligations is not limited to institutional reform litigation. Federal
legislation offers one useful comparison. Congress generally passes
two types of laws: laws that remain valid unless and until a future
Congress repeals them, and explicitly short-term laws, such as
appropriations bills and bills with sunset provisions, 22 that are valid
only for a limited period of time. These are roughly analogous to
permanent and temporary injunctions issued by courts. However,
when statutes are subject to expiration, the conditions are discussed
and debated up front, and the costs are internalized by the political
process. Long-standing institutional reform injunctions, in contrast,
can be subject to early termination without up-front bargaining over
the conditions of termination.
Despite raising concerns about the premature termination of
institutional reform injunctions, this Article does not argue that the
injunctions must remain in effect indefinitely. There will surely be
instances in which a government defendant can demonstrate that it

20.
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1367-68
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2012)).
21.
Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, H.R. 3041, 112th Cong. (2011). The proposed
legislation would mandate that state and local government officials be able to terminate consent
decrees within four years of entry or upon the expiration of predecessor officials' term in office,
unless the court finds that the plaintiffs have "demonstrate[d] that the denial of the motion to
modify or terminate the consent decree or any part of the consent decree is necessary to prevent
the violation of a requirement of Federal law that-(i) was actionable by such party; and (ii) was
addressed in the consent decree." Id. § 3. The bill was first introduced in 2005, and it was most
recently reintroduced in 2011.
22. See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001) (establishing ten-year sunset provision for reductions in tax
rates); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 110105(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (1994) (establishing ten-year sunset provision for federal ban
on certain "assault weapons"). See generally Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make
Me Democratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1975, 1982-85 (2015) (discussing "sunset lawmaking").
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has implemented effective and durable reforms. In other cases, the
passage of time may bring about new facts and circumstances that
make an existing injunction unnecessary or even nonsensical.
This Article has two primary goals, one descriptive and one
normative. First, it identifies the ways that existing institutional
reform injunctions are dying off and the implications of each form of
injunction death for institutional reform litigation. Second, based on
this account of injunction termination, it argues that scholars, judges,
and litigants must rethink their approach to the end stages of
institutional reform injunctions, and it offers strategies to ensure that
current and future institutional reform injunctions are not terminated
prematurely. The Article thus injects a new perspective into the
debate over the legacy of institutional reform litigation.
Part I of this Article surveys the relatively short history of
institutional reform injunctions as they have evolved since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown II. After introducing institutional
reform litigation and the debate surrounding its rise to prominence,
this Part focuses on the injunctions obtained by plaintiffs through this
form of litigation. By highlighting the wide range of injunctions that
remain in force today, this Part reveals the continuing importance of
institutional reform litigation and the stakes involved when
injunctions are terminated. It also identifies the relative lack of
attention paid to the termination of institutional reform injunctions.
Next, Part II examines the shrinking pool of aging institutional
reform injunctions. It identifies and describes three different ways
that institutional reform injunctions are coming to an end: by
dissolution, by design, and by disuse. For each form of injunction
death, this Part identifies the varying implications for the parties,
lawyers, and judges involved in institutional reform litigation.
Part III then explores how scholars, judges, and litigants
should think about the termination of existing and future institutional
reform injunctions. Drawing on the discussion in Part II, this Part
begins by arguing that the current, seemingly haphazard approach to
injunction termination should be reconsidered and replaced with an
approach that takes as its touchstone the goals of the injunction. To
that end, this Part then proposes strategies for improving and
rationalizing how institutional reform injunctions come to an end now
and in the future. The Article concludes by calling for renewed
attention to the end stages of institutional reform injunctions so that
the injunctions are not terminated prematurely.
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I. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS

For over sixty years, institutional reform litigation has
influenced the operation of government institutions and agencies at
the local, state, and federal levels. It has also been the subject of a
significant amount of critical scrutiny, attracting the attention of
judges, legislators, government officials, and scholars. Far from a
static concept, institutional reform litigation has evolved since its
earliest days, as the number of new lawsuits filed has declined and the
scope and nature of the resulting remedies have narrowed. But
institutional reform litigation is far from dead, and, more importantly
for this Article, doctrinal and attitudinal shifts in the institutional
reform litigation landscape are raising difficult questions concerning
the lifespan of institutional reform injunctions. After first tracing the
origin and defining features of institutional reform injunctions, this
Part then examines the critical backlash against this type of remedy
and the pool of injunctions that nonetheless remain in force.
A. Novel Litigation Brings Novel Remedies
Institutional reform litigation has been part of the American
legal landscape for over sixty years. Whether referred to as
"institutional reform litigation," "structural reform litigation," or
"public law litigation," 23 this type of lawsuit seeks court-ordered
injunctionS 24 aimed at reforming the day-to-day operation of
government institutions that are accused of committing systemic
violations of the law. This type of injunction dates back to the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education litigation, 25 and specifically
the Supreme Court's second ruling in the case. 26 That decision, known

23.

See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as

Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995 (1999) (explaining that this type of litigation has been
"termed, variously, 'public law litigation,' 'structural reform litigation,' or 'institutional reform
litigation' ").

24. This Article uses the term "injunction" to refer to court orders that are the product of a
litigated decree (i.e., an injunction that is designed and so-ordered by the judge), a consent decree
or a settlement agreement (i.e., an injunction that is designed by the parties and so-ordered by
the court), or similar relief.
25. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
26. See, e.g., Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 788 n.9 (1978) ("The birth of modern
institutional reform litigation can be traced to [Brown Il] . . . ."); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra
note 3, at 2 ("As a genre of constitutional litigation, structural reform has its roots in the Warren
Court era and the extraordinary effort to translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into
practice." (citation omitted)); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big
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as Brown I, implicitly acknowledged that merely ordering a
government agency to comply with its legal obligations-in that case,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-may not
be sufficient to eradicate the unlawful conduct. Rather, the Court
instructed the district courts to fashion a remedy that would compel
the defendant to take certain prescribed steps to ensure compliance
with its constitutional mandates. 27
In the years since Brown I, institutional reform litigation has
spread far beyond the context of school desegregation. 28 Plaintiffs have
brought lawsuits challenging the operation of a wide range of
government institutions, including police departments, 29 prisons and
jails, 30 school districts, 31 child welfare and social services agencies, 32
mental health facilities, 33 and public housing authorities, 34 among

Case and InstitutionalReform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2004) (referring to Brown I as "the
case that began the institutional reform era").
27. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing the district courts "to take such proceedings
and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties
to these cases"); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the Supreme Court in
Brown II "delegated the reconstructive task to the lower federal judges"); Margo Schlanger, Civil
Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
550, 552 (2006) ("Brown II authorized district judges to assess the need for, order, and oversee
sweeping changes not only to schools but to the full range of important governmental
institutions.").
28. See, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 3-4 (noting that "in time, the lessons of
school desegregation were transferred to other contexts"); Schlanger, supra note 23, at 1994-95
("[T]hrough implementation of Brown, the nation's litigants, lawyers, and judges grew
accustomed both to issuance of permanent injunctions against state and local public institutions,
and to extended court oversight of compliance.").
29. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and
Police Regulation by Data-DrivenSurveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 94-95 & n.6 (2012).
See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
30.
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 13-17 (1998); Schlanger, supra

&

note 23, at 2004 (discussing "a nationwide flood of class-action lawsuits leading to major court
orders requiring reform in such areas as housing conditions, security, medical care, mental
health care, sanitation, nutrition, and exercise").
31. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L.
SOC. CHANGE 183, 192-207 (2003) (discussing institutional reform litigation challenging public
school segregation and inequitable funding).
32.

See, e.g., SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND

THE FEDERAL COURTS (2000) (exploring the role of litigation in reforming the child welfare
system).
33.

See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed.

1989) (examining mental disability law in the United States and how the courts have influenced
this area).
34. See, e.g., Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the
Second Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1049 (2000) (examining the effects of
institutional reform litigation on the public housing authority in Chicago).
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others. Plaintiffs have sought to enforce their rights under the
Constitution 35 as well as a host of statutes and regulations. 36 Although
most of these cases have been litigated in federal court, state courts
have provided a forum for institutional reform litigation as well. 3 7
It is difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of institutional
reform litigation. Lawsuits challenging a governmental entity's
system-wide policies or practices can be brought by individuals as well
as government officials acting in their enforcement capacity. 38 The
targeted institutions are typically creatures of state or local
governments, but federal agencies can also be defendants in
institutional reform litigation. 39 Regardless of the identity of the
plaintiffs or defendants, institutional reform lawsuits seek to bring to
bear the remedial power of the courts-in the form of an injunctionto force a government institution to change how it operates so that it
honors the rights of the individuals it serves. 40
Just as there is no standard type of institutional reform
lawsuit, there is also no standard type of institutional reform
injunction. The Supreme Court, beginning with Brown II, has declined
to specify what institutional reform remedies should look like.4 1
Moreover, the injunctions can be the product of very different design

35.
For example, most institutional reform litigation targeting correctional facilities
involves claims to enforce provisions of the Constitution. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 30.
36.
For example, most institutional reform litigation targeting public housing authorities
involves claims to enforce federal statutes and regulations. See Seliga, supra note 34 (discussing
litigation against the Chicago Housing Authority).
See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO L.J. 1355,
37.
1358 (1991) (noting "what appears to be a growing docket of public law cases" in state courts).
38. Although institutional reform plaintiffs are typically individuals or classes of
individuals who are being harmed by the defendant's unlawful policies or procedures, the federal
government has also been an active plaintiff in institutional reform lawsuits. See, e.g., Stephen
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014) (discussing the
Department of Justice's use of litigation to prompt structural reform of police departments).
39. See, e.g., Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px)
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997) (establishing minimum standards for the treatment of minor children in
the custody of federal immigration officials).
40. Institutional reform litigation "does not include all litigation involving institutions. For
example, cases that do no more than address the constitutionality of a statutory scheme
governing institutions should not be characterized as institutional litigation." Theodore
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468 (1980).
41.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (instructing the district courts "to
take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases"). The Supreme Court's reluctance to provide
significant guidance is not surprising, as designing institutional reform injunctions is "one of the
most difficult tasks in our system of government." PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 3

(1988).
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processes: in cases in which a judge issues an injunction after ruling
on the merits of a lawsuit (referred to as "litigated injunctions"), the
judge typically designs an injunction setting forth what the defendant
must do to comply with the law; 4 2 in contrast, judges can have little or
no role in the creation of injunctions that the parties design
themselves and. submit to the judge for approval (referred to as
"consent decrees"). 43 Institutional reform remedies may also emerge
from hybrid processes in which, for example, a judge facilitates
negotiations between the parties 44 or designates a special master to
help the parties formulate a remedy. 45 Not surprisingly, the different
ways in which they are designed introduces considerable variation
among institutional reform injunctions.
Institutional reform injunctions also differ with respect to their
scope and level of detail. All institutional reform injunctions do more
than merely order a defendant to comply with the law, but the
specificity of the injunction's directives varies from case to case (and
sometimes as time goes on within a case). 46 Some injunctions provide
detailed instructions for the day-to-day operation of the institution, 47
42.
See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 800-05 (discussing different ways that judges can
dictate institutional reform remedies).
43.
See id. at 797-800 (discussing institutional reform injunctions formulated without the
participation of the judge). Even where judges do not participate directly in the formulation of
the remedy, "judges frequently do play a substantive role in encouraging and crafting complex
settlements of all kinds, including consent decrees, both actively and indirectly through the
parties' surmises or knowledge about a judge's substantive inclinations." Schlanger, supra note
23, at 2013; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (describing how, even in cases that
settle without a ruling on the merits, judges "are a ghostly but influential presence, through
their rulings in adjudicated cases and their anticipated response to the case at hand");
Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2013-14 ("Decrees develop out of the complex interplay of the
judges' promotion of settlement and the parties' expectations as to the outcome of litigation and
varying stakes and information." (footnotes omitted)).
44. See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 809-12 (discussing negotiated remedies); Susan
Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 805, 856 (1990) (arguing that judges in prison reform lawsuits should act as
"catalyst[s]" who "create[] processes and incentives in order to induce the parties to participate
in a deliberative process to formulate and implement an effective remedy").

45. See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 805-09 (discussing remedies formulated through
a process supervised by a judge-appointed special master).
46. For example, an injunction that initially gives a defendant broad discretion over how it
reforms its policies and practices may, after a period of non-compliance, be revised to specify the
particular actions that the defendant must take to remedy its unlawful actions.
47. Highly detailed directives have advantages and disadvantages. See, e.g., Buckholz et
al., supra note 26, at 844 ("Although detailed substantive provisions offer considerable
advantages for monitoring compliance and for administration, they restrict the defendants in
ways that may prove unreasonable in the long run."); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 4950 (acknowledging that some observers find the detailed directives contained in structural
reform injunctions to be "baffling," but arguing that specific directives may be "necessary and
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while others grant broad discretion to the government officials
charged with running the institution. 48 Similarly, depending in part
on the legal claims at issue 49 and whether the injunction was imposed
by the court or agreed to by the parties,5 0 the scope of the injunction
can be narrow or broad.5 1 The injunctions can also vary according to
their monitoring, reporting, and enforcement provisions.
Notwithstanding the diversity of institutional reform
injunctions, the remedies generally rely on two necessary conditions to
achieve their goals. First, the injunctions require a degree of flexibility
in their implementation. 5 2 When trying to spur systemic reforms
within a public institution, it is nearly impossible to identify all of the

appropriate ...
either as a way of minimizing the risk of evasion or as a way of helping the
bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them").
48.
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1082-99 (discussing less-directive structural
reform injunctions).

49.
Obviously, some institutional reform lawsuits involve more claims and challenge more
government actions than other lawsuits.
50.
The range of relief that a court can order after finding liability is narrower than the
relief that the parties can agree to in a court-approved consent decree. As the Supreme Court has
explained:
Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to
undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has
been adjudicated. But we have no doubt that ... [defendants] could settle the dispute
over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by
undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative
decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), but also
more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement.
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347, 354 n.6 (1992) ("[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the
requirements of federal law."); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a
trial."); Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2011 ("Such consent decrees have frequently incorporated
terms that a judge could not lawfully include in a contested order.").
Indeed, a consent decree must only "spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction[,] . . . come within the general scope of the case made by the
pleadings[,] and ... further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based." Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004).
51. See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 813 ("In a significant number of cases, the
affirmative program is of such extensive scope that its realization involves a basic restructuring
of the procedures or organization of the defendant institution.").
52. See id. at 818 ("Given the detail of these decrees and the lack of judicial expertise,
substantive modification and adjustment are unavoidable and should willingly be undertaken.");
Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing the "tentative and hesitant character" of
institutional reform injunctions and contending that they "must always be open to revision"). But
see Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1020 (characterizing institutional reform remedies of the
1970s and 1980s as "one-time readjustment[s] to fixed criteria").
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necessary changes at the outset. 53 As Professor Owen Fiss has
observed, "There is no easy, one-shot method of reconstructing an
institution." 54 After an injunction is ordered by a court, revisions will
often be necessary because, for example, the injunction is not working
effectively or its obligations become unduly burdensome for the
defendant.55 Such revisions can be the product of negotiations between
the parties or a litigated dispute before a judge. Regardless of how it
happens, the success of an institutional reform injunction can depend
on whether it is adapted to changing conditions.
The second necessary condition is durability. An institutional
reform injunction must remain in force long enough to achieve its
goals, typically to eradicate the unlawful behavior that was the basis
for the underlying lawsuit. 56 It is not enough for the injunction to
compel a series of remedial steps and then immediately dissolve into
the ether. Rather, the injunction must remain in effect-and the court
must retain jurisdiction to enforce the injunction-as long as is
required to bring the government institution into compliance with its
legal obligations.5 7 Although institutional reform injunctions must
eventually come to an end,5 8 the difficulty of reforming government
53. See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 789 ("The necessarily speculative nature of the
institutional planning required to devise these remedial regimes means that no single order of
relief can be regarded as definite and final . . . .").
54.

FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 3, at 28. According to Fiss, "[A] series

of interventions are inevitable, for the defendants' performance must be evaluated, and new
directions issued, time and time again." Id.; see also Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 817 ("The
complexity of the structural injunctions that are the usual outcome of successful institutional
reform litigation does much to deprive them of their finality.").
55. See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 817 (explaining that revisions to institutional
reform injunctions "may be triggered by a variety of circumstances or events that emerge in the
process of implementation").
56. See, e.g., id. at 842 ("The pervasive changes required of defendants are neither rapidly
nor easily made."); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 28 ("[T]he remedy involves the court in
nothing less than the reorganization of an ongoing institution, so as to remove the threat it poses
to constitutional values. The court's jurisdiction will last as long as the threat persists.").
57. See, e.g., Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 842-44 (discussing how long courts retain
jurisdiction over institutional reform injunctions); cf. id. at 842 ("Jurisdiction may even continue
after the defendant's full compliance with the terms of the decree: some courts have expressed
concern that the reform be permanent.").

58. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991)
(emphasizing that "[flrom the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended
as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination"). Writing in dissent, Justice Thurgood
Marshall offered a somewhat different assessment of the appropriate duration of institutional
reform injunctions involving school desegregation:
The concepts of temporariness and permanence have no direct relevance to courts'

powers in this context because the continued
the underlying purpose of the decree has
'permanent' only for the temporary period for
the violence that induced it and only so

need for a decree will turn on whether
is
been achieved. "The injunction ...
which it may last. It is justified only by
long as it counteracts a continuing
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institutions means that the injunctions may need to remain in place
for an extended period of time. 59
The flexibility and durability of institutional reform injunctions
make it possible for institutional reform lawsuits to do more than
merely identify legal violations and assign blame. Indeed, the
injunctions have the potential to fundamentally reshape public
institutions so that they comply with the law. But not all institutional
reform injunctions achieve their goals,60 and even the successful ones
have been assailed by critics of this form of litigation. The balance of
this Part explores the debate over institutional reform litigation and
the current state of institutional reform remedies.
B. InstitutionalReform Injunctions Under Attack
Institutional reform litigation-and specifically the injunctions
obtained through these lawsuits-has been controversial from the
outset.6 1 With its focus on systemic policies and practices of large
public institutions rather than isolated disputes between parties, early
critics characterized institutional reform litigation as a radical
departure from the traditional model of litigation. 62 At the most basic
level, the controversy is rooted in concerns about courts and judges
restructuring government institutions that are failing to comply with
intimidation. Familiar equity procedure assures opportunity for modifying and
vacating an injunction when its continuance is no longer warranted."
Id. at 267 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941)).
59. See, e.g., Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 813 (noting that successful implementation
of institutional reform injunctions "[g]enerally ... requires ongoing remedial action extending
over a substantial period of time"); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that the
remedial phase in institutional reform litigation "involves a long, continuous relationship
between the judge and the institution").
60.

See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (discussing attempts by the courts to bring about institutional reform).
61. See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 647, 656 (1988) (observing that, by 1976, "concern about the legitimacy of judicial efforts
to implement social policy through structural decrees was widespread").
62. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 3 (comparing institutional reform litigation with "the
traditional conception of adjudication"); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (arguing that litigation was not well-suited to the types of problems at
issue in institutional reform litigation); see also Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 17 ("The
structural mode is most often attacked on the ground that it involves a departure from some
ideal form.").
Not all scholars agree that institutional reform litigation represents such a departure from
traditional forms of litigation. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 40 (arguing that institutional
reform litigation broke no new ground with respect to either procedure or remedy); cf. Fiss,
Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 36 (arguing that "what has evolved has been the form of
adjudication, but not the function").
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the law. Thus, while proponents of institutional reform litigation have
characterized it as an essential tool for ensuring that government
institutions honor their legal obligations, 63 opponents have questioned
the legitimacy and capacity of courts ordering and overseeing such
remedies, while also highlighting federalism and separation-of-powers
concerns.
Challenges to the legitimacy of institutional reform remedies
tend to focus on the role of the judge in institutional reform
litigation. 64 Some scholars claim that judges who design, oversee, and
enforce institutional reform remedies are stepping outside their
proper role, exercising powers that are reserved to the executive and
legislative branches of government. 65 Such actions, they argue, raise
concerns about the separation of powerS 66 and undermine political
accountability. 67 Relatedly, injunctions that involve federal judges
overseeing state and local institutions have sparked strong objections
on federalism grounds. 68
Critics of institutional reform litigation have also questioned
whether judges have the capacity to design and oversee the types of
injunctions that result from these lawsuits. 69 Under this view,

63. For early defenses of institutional reform litigation, see, for example, FISS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 3; Chayes, supranote 3; and Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3.
More recent proponents of institutional reform litigation include Margo Schlanger, Charles,
Sabel, and William Simon. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2; Schlanger, supra note 27.
64. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 4, at 637 (contending "that since trial court remedial
discretion in institutional suits is inevitably political in nature, it must be regarded as
presumptively illegitimate"); see also Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform
Injunction: Oops ... It's Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161 (2003) (discussing "the core,
and very deep, critique that judges exercising broad, long-term remedial authority over local
institutions are playing God: making rules and issuing orders based solely or largely on their
own personal moral views").

See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
65.
949 (1978) (questioning the desirability of federal-court oversight of state governmental
institutions); Nagel, supra note 4 (arguing that separation-of-powers principles limit the
authority of federal courts to order relief against state institutions).
See Nagel, supra note 4, at 664 (arguing that "separation of powers clearly does impose
66.
limitations on the authority of federal courts to undertake executive and legislative functions
when ordering relief against state officials"); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1123-24 (arguing that
"separation of powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches" rather
than the courts).
67.
See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 958 (arguing that institutional reform remedies "can be
used essentially to bypass majoritarian political controls").
68.
See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 1140-41 (arguing that federal court involvement with
day-to-day operations of state institutions violates federalism principles).
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supranote 60, at 11-12 (discussing how judges are constrained in
69.
their decisions by both the prevailing legal culture and precedent); Sabel & Simon, supra note 2,
at 1017-18 (summarizing concerns about the capacity of courts and judges to reform
institutions).
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institutional reform remedies are undermined by the judge's and the
plaintiffs' lack of access to information about how the targeted
institution operates, 70 the inability to reach other government actors
who are implicated in the institution's ability to comply with the law,7 1
and the limited influence on low-level bureaucrats who must
ultimately carry out the sought-after reforms. 72
Other critics have focused more on the remedies themselves
and less on the role and limitations of the judge. For example, some
have worried that institutional reform injunctions-especially those
that contain highly detailed action items-can entrench or "lock in"
particular policies and procedures, thereby preventing future
government officials from adopting their own approaches. 73 A related
concern is the potential for collusion between government defendants
and plaintiffs during the injunction design phase. This can arise when
the parties jointly craft a consent decree in which the defendant
agrees to reforms that would be difficult or impossible to secure
through the usual political processes. 74
The critiques of institutional reform litigation have not gone
unaddressed. Scholars have vigorously defended the legitimacy of
institutional reform litigation,75 while also proposing adjustments that
70. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1017 ("[Cjritics doubted that courts had the
necessary information to supervise institutional restructuring effectively.").
71.

See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:Superintending Structural

Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979) (acknowledging the "structural
limitations on the extent to which judges can utilize the role of political powerbroker"); Horowitz,
supra note 4, at 1293 ("Even in a complex lawsuit with many parties, it is quite likely that some
major actors in the field have been left out of the litigation.").
72.
See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 44, at 807 (explaining that "[c]ourts lack the administrative
capacity to alter basic institutional practices directly and are constrained by both a limited
constitutional mandate and a narrow vision of their role").

73.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supranote 4, at 34 ("It is impossible for an agency to promulgate
a regulation containing a clause such as 'My successor cannot amend this regulation.' But if the
clause appears in a consent decree, perhaps the administrator gets his wish to dictate the
policies of his successor."); McConnell, supra note 4; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4; Morley, supra note 4; Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme

Court, supra note 4; Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding
Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 892, 896-97 (2011) (discussing institutional reform
consent decrees as a "source of [government] entrenchment through private law involv[ing] local
governments entering into contractual precommitments that bind future governments").

74. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 4, at 1294, 1305 (arguing that a consent decree can be "a
shortcut around political constraints"); McConnell, supra note 4, at 301 (arguing that "one of the
evils to be guarded against is the collusive settlement-government lawyers settling a suit on
favorable terms to the opposing party precisely because they expect that successive
administrations may be less sympathetic to its cause"); Serkin, supra note 73, at 897 ("The
litigation process allows government actors to agree to politically unpalatable policy changes.").
75. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107 (1977) (dismissing
federalism concerns by arguing that "the states are bound by federal law, including the Bill of
Rights, and the ultimate power to determine the consistency of state laws with superior federal
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Yet while

continue,7 7

its defenders
challenges to institutional reform litigation
have largely departed from the field.78
As the debate over institutional reform litigation has unfolded
in the pages of law reviews, the Supreme Court has expressed growing
discomfort with this form of litigation.7 9 Since granting lower courts
considerable leeway to formulate appropriate remedies in Brown II,
the Court has offered increasingly unfavorable assessments of
institutional reform litigation and its resulting injunctions.8 0 This
criticism reached its peak in the Court's most recent consideration of
the subject, its 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores.8A In Horne, a 5-4
majority held that injunctions resulting from institutional reform
litigation must be easier to terminate than all other types of
norms is allocated to a federal court"); Sturm, supra note 37, at 1359 (offering "a model of public
remedial decisionmaking that accounts for the particular demands of the remedial process while
complying with the requirements of a legitimate judicial role"); Zaring, supranote 26, at 1033-34
("To be sure, consent decrees permit elected officials to bind their successors, but the same is true
of any contract with lock-in effects. By providing stability and certainty, consent decrees need not
necessarily always be pernicious." (footnote omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 44, at 808 (describing how courts "should structure the
remedial process to avoid, or at least minimize, the negative consequences of the remedial
dilemma").

77. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 4.
78. See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 (arguing that "civil rights injunctions deserve the
energetic defense of those in favor of the values they protect").
79. See, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the "Burger Court
counterassault" on institutional reform litigation); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the
Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence,
84 TEx. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's hostility toward institutional
reform litigation)); Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 886 n.70 (2010) (observing, after
Horne v. Flores, that "the Court's hostility to prospective, injunctive relief seems, if anything, to
have deepened").
80. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (discussing the permissible scope of
institutional reform remedies); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (explaining that
courts "must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs, consistent with the Constitution"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (expressing
concern that federal courts are "becom[ing] increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
operations"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (urging federal courts to ground their
rulings in constitutional requirements "rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a
detention facility" (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539)); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984)
(emphasizing "the very limited role that courts should play in the administration of detention
facilities"); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992) (holding that district
courts must take a "flexible approach" to motions to modify or terminate institutional reform
injunctions); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004) (expressing concern about institutional
reform injunctions that "improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and
executive powers"); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 434 (2009) (holding that courts must "ensur[e]
that 'responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and
its officials'" (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442)).
81. 557 U.S. 433 (2004).
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injunctions ordered by the federal courts. 82 Such differential treatment
is necessary, the Court explained, for three reasons: the likelihood
that changed circumstances will necessitate a reexamination of
injunctions that last for many years, federalism concerns caused by
federal court interference with state and local institutions, and what
the Court characterized as the unusual "dynamics" of institutional
reform litigation. 83 Thus, while the Court has not put an end to
institutional reform litigation,8 4 the Horne decision reveals a Court
that is deeply skeptical of this type of lawsuit and its resulting
remedies.8 5
Legislators have also expressed hostility towards institutional
reform litigation. Congress targeted institutional reform litigation in
1996, when it limited lawsuits challenging the policies and practices of
America's prisons. 8 6 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, it is now
more difficult for courts to issue new prison reform injunctions,8 7 and
it is easier for defendants to overturn prison reform injunctions after
they are in place.88 In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives has

82.
83.
84.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 447-48.
See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 64, at 156 ("[Tjhe Supreme Court has not sustained any

broadside constitutional challenges to structural reform injunctions; challenges mounted on

federalism and separation of powers grounds have succeeded only in causing the Court to warn
lower court judges to be mindful of state and congressional prerogatives."); Siegel, supra note 79,
at 1113 (observing that "the apocalyptic confrontation between Warren Court 'activism' and
Rehnquist Court 'restraint' never came to fruition" and "institutional reform limped on"); Yoo,
supra note 4, at 1133 ("[T]his concern about federalism appears to be nothing more than that-a

concern. The Court does not appear to have ever invalidated a structural remedy on the ground
that it improperly intruded upon the proper authority of state and local institutions.").
85. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 79, at 886 n.70 (observing, after Horne, that "the Court's
hostility to prospective, injunctive relief seems, if anything, to have deepened"); Elizabeth G.
Porter, PragmatismRules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 139 (2015) (characterizing Horne as "an
extended critique of (almost a rant against) institutional reform litigation"); Alex Reinert,
ProceduralBarriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 931, 940 (2010) ("In Horne v. Flores, the Court imposed new barriers to systemic reform
cases.").
86. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(a), 3626; and in scattered sections of 28 and
42 U.S.C.).
87. See 18 U.S.C § 3626(a)(1)(A) ("The court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right.").
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A). Under the PLRA,
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is
ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener ...
2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief [or] 1 year
after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief
under this paragraph.
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introduced legislation that would impose similar limits on the
duration of consent decrees in all civil cases, but that bill has not yet
been enacted into law. 8 9 State legislatures have also passed laws
intended to limit state officials' ability to enter into consent decrees in
institutional reform cases. 90
Given these barriers to securing and defending systemic relief,
it is not surprising that institutional reform litigation is commonly
understood to be in retreat. Indeed, observers have been commenting
on its decline for decades,9 1 with some perceiving the death of
institutional reform litigation 92 and others characterizing institutional
reform injunctions as "vestiges of a bygone era." 9 3 Whether due to the
doctrinal shifts documented above, or a changing sense of the role of
litigation in securing meaningful institutional reform, this form of
litigation has lost much of the prominence and momentum it had,
during its initial phases. 94
18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(b)(1).

The court shall grant the motion to terminate the injunction unless the

court makes written findings that the injunction "remains necessary to correct a current and

ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive
means to correct the violation." Id. § 3626(b)(3).
89.
Consent Decree Fairness Act, H.R. 3041, 112th Cong. (2011). This was not the first
time that Congress has attempted to limit the duration of institutional reform injunctions. See
Judicial Improvement Act, 144 CONG. REC. S6187-88 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (proposing a
reform bill that would "prevent consent decrees from remaining in effect once a proper remedy

has been implemented").
90.

See, e.g., Jane Perkins, Negotiating Consent Decrees that Work, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE

REV. 500, 502 (2008) (stating that "[s]ome states have enacted laws that require state officials to
obtain the governor's or legislature's permission before entering into a consent decree").
91. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1982) (observing that, by the mid-1970s,
"[t]he long summer of social reform that occupied the middle third of the century was drawing to
a close"). But cf. Schlanger, supra note 27, at 568-69 (comparing the "conventional story" of
decline with a "revisionist story ... of continuity in volume and perhaps in other important
aspects of court-ordered practice").
92.
See Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004) (observing
that "structural injunctions have receded from the remedial scene" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Gilles, supra note 64, at 145 (referring to the "apparent death of the structural reform
injunction"). But cf. Gilles, supra note 64, at 146-47 (discussing the rise of "calls for injunctive
relief to restructure public institutions [coming] from the unlikely quarters of conservative think
tanks and institutes"); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 566 (challenging "the generally accepted
view . . . that civil rights injunctive practice has become essentially moribund").
93.
Gilles, supra note 64, at 144 (observing that "judicially mandated structural reform
injunctions appear to be vestiges of a bygone era").
94.
See id. at 146 (attributing the decline of structural reform litigation to "a sort of subconstitutional, extra-legal discomfort with the role of judges in institutional reform litigation");
Schlanger, supra note 27, at 565 (observing that the "most common explanation" for changes in
institutional reform litigation practice is "the increasing conservatism of the federal bench"). But
cf. Schlanger, supra note 27, at 553 ("[T]he increasing conservatism of the federal bench has not
been as devastating to civil rights injunctive practice as a more jurocentric view might predict.").
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Yet institutional reform litigation endures. 95 Even though the
number of new lawsuits has fallen from its peak, 96 institutional reform
litigation remains a powerful force for change.9 7 Public institutions
continue to violate rights in a systemic manner, 98 plaintiffs continue to
bring institutional reform lawsuits, and courts continue to order new
injunctions aimed at reforming those government institutions. 99
Moreover, countless injunctions issued in the past continue to
influence the day-to-day operation of government institutions across a
wide range of legal areas.1 00 The remedies may look somewhat
different than in the past 0 1-for example, many injunctions have
shifted from highly detailed command-and-control-style directives to
what Professors
Charles
Sabel and William Simon call
1
0
"experimentalist intervention" 2-but institutional reform litigation
has not vanished. 103 Indeed, even in the context of prisoner litigation,
95.

See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4, at 10

(arguing that "the incidence and effect of institutional reform litigation" have not waned); Sabel
& Simon, supra note 2, at 1021 (referring to the "protean persistence of public law litigation");
Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 ("Public law litigation is far from dead.").
96. See Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2032 n.165 (observing that "the number of class action
filings and of civil rights class action filings, brought both by prisoners and nonprisoners,
followed a downward trend from their peak in the mid 1970s until the early 1990s").
97. See id. (disputing claim that institutional reform litigation has decreased in
significance).
98. See Gilles, supra note 64, at 145 ("There continue to exist sufficiently egregious,
systemic constitutional issues that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support and
depth of reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunction.").
99.

See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4, at 11 ("New

decrees get issued, piling up on the old, few of which are actually terminated."); Margo
Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the PracticalObscurity of
Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 515 (2010) ("Every year, federal and
state courts put in place orders that regulate the prospective operations of certainly hundreds
and probably thousands of large government and private enterprises.").
100. See, e.g., Schlanger; supra note 23, at 2034-35, 2035 nn.178-83 (identifying "current
litigation and ongoing court-ordered reform in the areas of child welfare, mental health and
mental retardation facilities, juvenile correction facilities, public housing, and public school
funding" (footnotes omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 27, at 602 (identifying, in the prison reform context, "a
marked shift in what might be called the depth of court-ordered regulation, as the paradigm
intervention shifted from an omnibus model to something more finegrained").
102. Simon & Sabel, supra note 2, at 1019 ("The evolution of structural remedies in recent
decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from command-and-controlinjunctive regulation
toward experimentalist intervention."). As Sabel and Simon explain, command-and-control
regulation "takes the form of comprehensive regimes of fixed and specific rules set by a central
authority.... By contrast, experimentalist regulation combines more flexible and provisional
norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability." Id.
103. See id. at 1018 (stating that "despite decades of criticism and restrictive doctrines, the
lower courts continue to play a crucial role in a still-growing movement of institutional reform in
the core areas of public law practice . . .: schools, prisons, mental health, police, and housing");
Zaring, supra note 26, at 1020 (observing that institutional reform litigation "remains a vibrant
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where, for over twenty years, federal law has curtailed the scope and
duration of injunctions, institutional reform litigation persists. 104
C. What's Left: The Pool of Aging InstitutionalReform Injunctions
Whatever the future holds for institutional reform litigation,
there is currently a pool of injunctions that remain in effect, binding
the parties, directing government defendants to take specified
remedial measures, and granting judges continuing jurisdiction over
the underlying case. The injunctions may be increasingly outdated10 5
and difficult to identify,10 6 but they continue to influence a wide range
of government institutions. 10 7
Yet it is not clear what will happen to these injunctions as they
age. Whether due to lack of foresight or well-considered choices, the
and active part of the law, governing a variety of different types of local institutions"). The
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Plata, upholding a controversial prison reform injunction
that addressed medical and mental health care, is the most recent example of a structural
reform injunction surviving review by the Court. See 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
104. See Margo Schlanger, Trends in PrisonerLitigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 155 (2015) (arguing that the PLRA "has succeeded in radically
shrinking-but not eliminating-the coverage" or injunctions in prison reform litigation); Simon
& Sabel, supra note 2, at 1038 (observing that even after the PLRA, "the volume of prison
litigation remains substantial, and although structural orders tend to be narrower than in the
past, they are still common").
105. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran-Robison, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees: School
Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1350 ("With the growth of prison litigation, Congress
witnessed an analogous growth in 'out-dated consent decrees' managed by federal courts."
(quoting Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance
Between Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REV. 981, 1003 (1999))).
106. See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 520 (describing the "practical obscurity" of
institutional reform injunctions); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 570-71 (noting that institutional
reform injunctions are often "completely unobservable by ordinary case research methods"). As
Margo Schlanger explains:
[I]t turns out that most injunctive orders are not public, or at least not effectively so.
They are filed with courts and then hidden away in court archives. They are typically
difficult to obtain, as a collection or a single source, even for the well-funded and wellinformed. They are not embedded in an easily usable information infrastructure. Even
a person who knows the type of case or its caption, its filing date, and its court, may or
may not be able to obtain a particular injunction for a reasonable fee. The most
persevering experts struggle and probably fail to find all the injunctions obtained by
or against most government agencies, or all the injunctions about a specified subject.
Schlanger, supra note 99, at 516. Even where courts have adopted electronic filing systems, older
cases are either excluded from those systems or have had just their docket sheet digitized. And
even where injunctions are available electronically, "locating a digitized decree often requires the
same type of case-specific information needed to locate a hard-copy file." Id. at 521.
107. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2034-35 (referring to "ongoing court-ordered
reform in the areas of, for example, child welfare, mental health and mental retardation
facilities, juvenile correction facilities, public housing, and public school funding" (footnotes
omitted)).
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parties and judges who designed institutional reform injunctions
rarely specified how the injunctions should end. Rather, the text of the
injunctions typically focused on the steps that government defendants
must take in order to achieve compliance with their legal obligations,
how their progress would be measured, and how the injunction could
be enforced.
It is easy to ignore the pool of existing institutional reform
injunctions. After all, the injunctions are the product of lawsuits that
were brought years, if not decades, ago. But these aging injunctions
are not dusty relics from a bygone era. Unlike antiquated statutes
that fall into desuetude, the passage of time has not rendered the
injunctions irrelevant to the people whose rights they are designed to
vindicate. 10s To the contrary, the injunctions are concerned with
governmental activities that are as vital today as they were when the
injunctions were issued.109
Moreover, once an institutional reform injunction is gone, there
is no guarantee that plaintiffs can again obtain similar relief if the
original violations reoccur. Changes in the legal landscape since
Brown II have made it harder for plaintiffs to win new institutional
reform lawsuits. 110 Although not necessarily arising in the context of
institutional reform litigation, a number of recent Supreme Court
decisions now make it difficult or impossible for institutional reform
plaintiffs to establish standing to sue,11 1 adequately plead their claims
in a complaint, 112 invoke private rights of action to enforce

108. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 ("[C]ivil rights injunctions deserve the
energetic defense of those in favor of the values they protect.").
109. See, e.g., id. ("[W]e can be sure that [public law litigation] continues to regulate much
government conduct in many jurisdictions.").
110. See, e.g., SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015) (discussing the increasing limitations on plaintiffs' ability to
enforce their rights through litigation); Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearanceof
Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536 (2016) (observing that
"procedural and substantive constraints on legal access now litter the doctrinal landscape").
111. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976); see also
Gilles, supra note 64, at 146 (explaining that "courts have erected barriers, principally in the
form of standing requirements, to the institution of suits aimed at structural reform
injunctions"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failureof Injury Analysis, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 301, 333 (2002) (arguing that Article III standing rules disadvantage low-income
plaintiffs).
112. See Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobiain the
Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (2014) (demonstrating that Twombly, Iqbal, and other
recent Supreme Court decisions have had "palpably negative effects on plaintiffs").
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constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, 113 and proceed as
a class action. 114
Even when institutional reform claims remain viable, plaintiffs
may not be able to find lawyers to bring the lawsuits. 115 Federal
funding for legal services has not kept up with the rising demand for
representation since the early 1980s, 116 and the legal services offices
that receive federal funding have been barred from bringing class
actions since 1996.117 Moreover, lawyers who are permitted to
represent plaintiffs in institutional reform lawsuits are now less likely
to be eligible for attorneys' fees due to changes in Supreme Court
precedent.118
Despite the stakes, scholars have had little to say about the
death of institutional reform injunctions. Institutional reform
litigation received considerable attention as it rose to prominence in
the 1960s and 1970s, 119 but that largely waned by the 1990s.1 2 0 The

113. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (rejecting a
private right of action to enforce Supremacy Clause); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290
(2002) (rejecting a private right of action to enforce federal statutory provisions); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (rejecting a private right of action to enforce federal regulatory
provisions); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 900 (2016) (discussing recent cases that have "narrowed the
rights of private parties to challenge statutory violations in court").
114. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (adopting a highly
restrictive interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2)); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348
(2011) (enforcing arbitration provision containing a class-action waiver despite lower-court ruling
that it was unconscionable); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012)
(observing that "most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class action waivers"
following Concepcion); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 781
(2016) ("Present-day upheaval in class action procedure threatens to alter-perhaps to imperilstructural reform litigation in the federal courts.").
115. See Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693,
1696-1705 (2004) (discussing limitations on the ability of lawyers to pursue NAACP-style
litigation campaigns).
116. See, e.g., Alan W. Houseman & Linda E. Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief
History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POL'Y 19-22, 29-33
(2007),
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SN3KAC2G] (summarizing history of legal services funding in the United States).
117. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 (1996) ("None of the funds appropriated in this Act
to the Legal Services Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or
entity . . . that initiates or participates in a class action suit.").
118. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (rejecting the "catalyst theory" as a permissible basis for an award of
attorneys' fees); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys
General, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2007) (discussing Supreme Court decisions limiting the
ability of plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees).
119. See supra Part I.A-B.
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winding down of school desegregation injunctions, 121 the PLRA's limits
on prison reform injunctions, 122 and the Supreme Court's sporadic
interest in reviewing motions to terminate or modify institutional
reform injunctions, 123 prompted some analysis of the end stages of
institutional reform remedies. However, larger questions concerning
the fate of existing injunctions have gone unanswered. 124
Parts II and III of this Article examine the fate of current and
future institutional reform injunctions. For those injunctions, the
pressing questions are: What is happening to the pool of existing
institutional reform injunctions, and what should happen to those
injunctions? Part II explores the first of these questions, while Part III
takes up the second.
II. A SHRINKING POOL: THE DEATH OF
AGING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS
Despite the controversy and backlash generated by
institutional reform litigation, many institutional reform injunctions
remain in effect. This pool of existing injunctions is not frozen in place,
however. As an injunction ages, the likelihood that it will be
terminated increases. While the termination of institutional reform
injunctions is not intrinsically good or bad-indeed, every injunction
must come to an end eventually-how and when an injunction
terminates can have varying implications for the parties and judges
involved in the litigation. By identifying the three ways that
institutional reform injunctions are currently coming to an end-by
dissolution, by design, and by disuse-and by drawing out the
consequences of each form of injunction death, this Part offers a new
perspective on this essential, yet often overlooked, aspect of
institutional reform litigation.

120. See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 567 (discussing "the sharp drop-off in scholarly
interest in civil rights injunctions between the 1980s and the 1990s, when the stream of books
and major law review articles slowed to a trickle").
121. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 5; Poser, supra note 5.
122. See, e.g., Baradaran-Robison, supra note 105; Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
123. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101 (1986); Kim, supra note 6; David S.
Konczal, Ruing Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standardfor Modifying Consent Decrees and an
Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130 (1996); Kelley, supra note 6; Note, The Modification of
Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986).
124. But see SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4 (expressing

concern about the longevity of institutional reform injunctions).
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A. Death by Dissolution
The most visible way that institutional reform injunctions end
is when the court that originally ordered the injunction dissolves or
terminates it. This can happen when, at some point during the
lifespan of the injunction, the defendant files a motion to terminate
the injunction under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 125 The most common basis for termination under Rule
60(b) is that "a significant change either in factual conditions or in
law" renders continued enforcement of the injunction "detrimental to
the public interest." 126 If a defendant carries this burden, the court
must terminate or modify the injunction in light of such changed
circumstances. 1 2 7 Unlike the other forms of injunction death discussed
in this Part, termination through a Rule 60(b) motion typically results
in a judicial opinion that creates a record of the termination. 128
While Rule 60(b) relief has always been available in
institutional reform litigation, 129 the standard for terminating an
institutional reform injunction has changed in recent years. During
the early decades of institutional reform litigation, the injunctiontermination standard was difficult to satisfy. Defendants needed to
show either a change in law that rendered the injunction inconsistent
with the law, or a "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions." 13 0 This was the termination standard that applied to any
injunction issued by a federal court, regardless of whether it arose
from institutional reform litigation or another type of litigation.
More recently, the Supreme Court has made it easier to
terminate institutional reform injunctions. Beginning in the early
1990S 1 31 and culminating with its 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores,132

125. Motions to terminate an institutional reform injunction are typically made pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(5), which states that "the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding" if "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
126. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail,
502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).
127. Horne, 557 U.S. at 447.
128.

See, e.g., 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§

2863

(3d ed. 2016) (collecting cases).
129. Aside from the general restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took place
in 2007, the current version of Rule 60(b) has been in effect since 1946. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60
notes.
130. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
131. Rufo, 502 U.S. 367 (adopting flexible approach to Rule 60(b) motions for all
institutional reform injunctions); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
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the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to take a more "flexible
approach" to motions to terminate institutional reform injunctions. 133
According to the Court, this flexibility should be used "to ensure that
responsibility for discharging the [defendant's] obligations is returned
promptly to the State and its officials." 134 Regardless of whether the
injunction is the product of a litigated decree or a consent decree, 135
courts must terminate institutional reform injunctions in accordance
with this easier-to-satisfy standard.
The Supreme Court's message in Horne was clear: aging
institutional reform injunctions are not entitled to the same respect as
other injunctions. 136 Indeed, the decision has been viewed as an
invitation to defendants to file Rule 60(b) motions seeking to overturn
institutional reform injunctions. 137 And that appears to be what has
248 (1991) (adopting flexible approach to Rule 60(b) motion to dissolve a school desegregation
injunction).
132. 557 U.S. 433.
133. Id. at 450 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381). The Court first adopted the "flexible
approach" seventeen years earlier in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381
(1992), but Horne applied it in a way that made it even easier to terminate institutional reform

injunctions. See Porter, supra note 85, at 140 ("Despite characterizing its decision as adhering to
a 'flexible approach,' the Court made clear that such 'flexibility' had but one purpose: to return
oversight responsibility to state and federal officials as soon as possible."); Kelley, supra note 6,
at 292 (arguing that the Court's approach in Horne "would functionally eliminate the power of
prophylactic decrees").
134. Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. The Court offered three reasons for making it easier to
terminate institutional reform injunctions: the likelihood that changed circumstances will
necessitate a reexamination of injunctions that last for many years, federalism concerns caused
by federal court interference with state and local institutions, and what the Court characterized

as the unusual "dynamics" of institutional reform litigation. Id. at 447-48.
135. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378 (describing a "consent decree" as "an agreement that the
parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees"); see also Sys. Fed'n No.
91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) ("The source of the power to modify [an existing consent
decree] is of course the fact that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the
issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of
the party who obtained that equitable relief."); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114
(1932) ("We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in
adaptation to changed conditions, though it was entered by consent. . . . If the reservation had
been omitted [from the terms of the decree], power there still would be by force of principles
inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery.").
136. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 79, at 886 n.70 (arguing that Horne demonstrates the
Court's deepening hostility to prospective, injunctive relief); Kim, supra note 6, at 1466 ("Horne
and its progeny have made it significantly easier for government-defendants to terminate
ongoing decrees in institutional reform cases."); Kelley, supra note 6, at 307 ("All the new
standards introduced in Horne make it much easier for state and local governments, even those
with a history of neglect, to escape court orders.").
137. See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the
majority opinion "will create the dangerous possibility that orders, judgments, and decrees long
final or acquiesced in, will be unwarrantedly subject to perpetual challenge, offering defendants
unjustifiable opportunities endlessly to relitigate underlying violations with the burden of proof
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happened during the seven years since Horne was decided. Lower
courts have granted some motions 1 38 and denied others, 139 but the
pattern has been established: government defendants claim that
changed circumstances warrant the dissolution (or at least
weakening) of existing institutional reform injunctions, while
plaintiffs are left clinging to injunctions that are becoming
increasingly outdated.
At first glance, death by dissolution may appear to be entirely
favorable to defendants and unfavorable to plaintiffs. But the
implications of injunction termination under the easier-to-satisfy
Horne approach can cut in different directions. On the one hand,
government defendants are able to obtain relief from institutional
reform injunctions that are no longer necessary or no longer equitable
due to changes in the facts or law. Yet on the other hand, by signaling
that institutional reform injunctions are worthy of less respect than
other injunctions, the Supreme Court's current approach is likely to
complicate the implementation of existing injunctions. For example, if
defendants believe that they can terminate injunctions sooner than
originally expected, they may be less committed to the difficult work of
achieving true and lasting structural reform. Similarly, defendants
may choose to engage in foot-dragging in anticipation of an early
motion to terminate. But even assuming good faith, an easier-tosatisfy termination standard may create an added layer of uncertainty
for defendants, especially those operating under older injunctions. If
termination appears to be easier to obtain than in the past,
defendants may be left unsure about the ongoing validity of
injunctions that have been in force for some time. After all, if the
defendant can go back to court and ask for termination based on the
imposed once again upon the plaintiffs"); Porter, supra note 85, at 140 (observing that Horne
decision "practically invit[es] those operating under consent decrees to file 60(b)(5) motions and
strongly signal[s] lower courts to get out of the business of institutional reform"); Jonathan
Simon, Horne v. Flores: The Roberts Court Takes Aim at Institutional Reform Litigation,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 3, 2009 12:49 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/08/
horne-v-flores-the-roberts-court-takes-aim-at-institutional-reform-litigation.html
[https://perma.cc/GG49-MLWM] ("What goes without saying is that there will be a great deal of
new litigation testing the meaning of institutional reform injunction under these new defendant
(and intervenor) friendly standards.").
138. See, e.g., Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2015); John B. v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394
(6th Cir. 2013); Petties v. District of Columbia, 662 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Consumer
Advisory Bd. v. Harvey, 697 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132-33 (D. Me. 2010); Basel v. Bielaczyz, No. 7440135-BC, 2009 WL 2843906 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2009).
139. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir. 2013); L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2010); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126
(D.D.C. 2010); Juan F. v. Rell, No. 3:89-CV-859 (CFD), 2010 WL 5590094 (D. Conn. Sept. 22,
2010); LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98-100, 115 (D.D.C. 2010).
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Horne analysis, government officials may feel less pressure to comply
with the injunction. But until an injunction is terminated, it remains
binding and a defendant's failure to comply may expose it to courtordered sanctions.
The Court's apparent disdain for institutional reform litigation
and the weaker injunction-termination standard announced in Horne
are also likely to lead to earlier and more frequent termination
motions. 140 These motions impose costs on the parties and the court.
As a general matter, litigating motions to terminate diverts attention
and resources from the implementation, monitoring, and enforcement
of the injunction. Motions to terminate can also waste judicial and
litigant resources, particularly when they are merely a second bite at
the apple, enabling defendants to relitigate issues that were decided
before the injunction came into effect. These costs typically affect
institutional reform plaintiffs more than defendants, as the plaintiffs'
access to legal resources is usually more limited.
Beyond the impact on the pool of existing injunctions, the
Supreme Court's approach also has implications for the design and
implementation of future injunctions. In the past, when institutional
reform injunctions were subject to the traditional injunctiontermination standard, the designers of an injunction could justifiably
assume that it would be in place for an indefinite period of time. This
is no longer a safe assumption. Thus, designers today must anticipate
the possibility of earlier termination by, for example, requiring the
defendant to implement reforms and come into compliance on a
compressed timetable. Similarly, the specter of early termination may
also prompt quicker motions for contempt when a defendant is out of
compliance with the injunction; if plaintiffs are not confident that an
injunction will remain in place, they may feel compelled to
aggressively enforce its terms rather than give the defendant more
time to improve its performance.
B. Death by Design
Terminating an institutional reform injunction does not
necessarily require a trip to court-some end according to the terms of
the injunction itself. This occurs when the designers of the
injunction-whether the judge in the case of a litigated decree, or the
parties in the case of a consent decree-specify at the outset when and
under what conditions the injunction will terminate. Although there is
no standard language or set of triggering events for injunction140. See supra note 137.
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termination provisions, they can be grouped into two categories: those
based on the passage of time and those based on the defendant's
performance. 14 1
provisions mandate that the
Time-based termination
injunction will end after the passage of a specified period of time or on
a particular date. The injunction's termination is therefore not linked
to whether the policies and practices targeted by the injunctive relief
actually have been reformed. Indeed, the injunction will cease to bind
the parties once the time limit is reached regardless of the defendant's
compliance with the injunction.
In contrast, performance-based termination provisions become
operative only when the defendant meets certain benchmarks or
standards set forth in the injunction. Performance-based termination
provisions are common where the legal violation targeted by the
lawsuit is one that is easily measurable. So, for example, in
institutional reform lawsuits challenging delays in agency processing
or adjudication, the injunction may remain in force until the
defendant shows that the unlawful delays have been eliminated.
Similarly, if the litigation is targeting systemic agency errors, the
injunction can be designed to last until the error rate is reduced to an
acceptable level. Regardless of the specific goals, these performancebased termination provisions are intended to ensure that the
injunction remains in force as long as necessary to remedy the
underlying violation.
The implications of injunction death by design vary depending
on whether the termination is based on time or performance. For
injunctions that end due to the mere passage of time, the most
striking consequence is that the injunction may terminate before the
defendant has actually remedied the alleged unlawful conduct that
gave rise to the litigation in the first place. To be sure, injunctions
that include time-based termination provisions are intended to fix the
problem before the injunction expires; 142 however, it is not difficult to
imagine violations persisting when the injunction's time-based
termination provision becomes operative. Plaintiffs are always free to
file a new lawsuit and seek another injunction against the defendant,
but such relitigation threatens to waste judicial and litigant resources.
Moreover, given that plaintiffs in institutional reform lawsuits tend to
141. Some termination provisions are hybrids, establishing that the injunctions will come to
an end based on some combination of the passage of time and the achievement of specified
performance benchmarks.
142. After all, that is the point of the injunction. In addition, in institutional reform lawsuits
that proceed as class actions, any settlement or consent decree cannot be approved by the district
court until the court finds that it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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have limited access to legal resources, relitigating a violation because
a previous injunction was time-limited raises distributive justice
concerns. Finally, knowing that the injunction will terminate
regardless of its performance can create undesirable incentives for the
defendant; for example, in an effort to run out the clock, it may choose
strategic foot-dragging over implementing the difficult reforms
necessary to remedy the violations targeted by the litigation.
In contrast, injunctions that are set to terminate upon the
satisfaction of specified performance goals have a different set of
implications for institutional reform litigation. Although somewhat
counterintuitive, not all injunctions that end due to performancebased terminations
are
success
stories.
Performance-based
termination provisions are typically part of an injunction's original
design, meaning that years-if not decades-can go by before the
provisions become operative. Given the limits of foresight, just because
a defendant's performance reaches a previously specified benchmark
does not guarantee that the underlying violations have been
remedied. 143 That depends on the extent to which the benchmark
continues to reflect compliance with the law. Relatedly, the success of
performance-based termination provisions also depends on the
injunction's monitoring and reporting provisions; without access to
performance data that is comprehensive and accurate, it is difficult for
the parties and the court to know whether a defendant has satisfied
the performance goals that trigger termination of the injunction. 144
Performance-based
termination
of institutional reform
injunctions raises another concern: the threat of relapse. Injunctions
that end because the defendant meets or exceeds the prescribed
performance benchmarks may no longer be necessary, as where the
defendant has institutionalized reforms that will prevent future
violations from occurring. However, meeting performance benchmarks
at one point in time does not necessarily mean that a defendant has
undergone such reforms. Thus, performance-based termination may
leave the door open for old violations to recur soon after the plaintiff
and the court direct their gaze elsewhere.

143. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1102 (describing the "baffling perplexities" that courts
encounter when they attempt to envision the future in institutional reform litigation).
144. The difficulty of designing effective performance metrics for governmental entities is
well documented in the bureaucracy literature. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 40-53 (rev. ed. 2010); JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 154-78 (1991).
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C. Death by Disuse
Institutional reform injunctions are also ending as a result of
disuse. This is a form of constructive termination that occurs when an
injunction is forgotten or ignored by the parties responsible for
implementing and monitoring it, and by the court charged with
overseeing it. For injunctions that do not automatically expire upon
the passage of a specified period of time, 14 5 death by disuse can
happen when an otherwise indefinite injunction ages and the parties,
lawyers, and judges who were involved in the litigation shift their
attention to other matters, retire, or even die themselves. The
injunction remains binding on paper, but at some point it falls into
desuetude and becomes, in effect, dormant. 146
For obvious reasons, the likelihood of this form of termination
increases as an injunction ages. Although the participants in
institutional reform litigation can take actions to ensure that old
injunctions do not fade away-for example, new lawyers can take over
for outgoing lawyers, new party representatives can be substituted for
those who are no longer involved in the case, and new judges can
replace judges who leave the bench-these steps are not always taken.
Thus, as institutional reform injunctions grow older, they become
susceptible to falling into disuse.
By its very nature, death by disuse is nearly impossible to
observe or track. It results not from a court ruling or a termination
provision written into the injunction, but from inactivity, inattention,
and fading memories. That said, an example from New York City
spanning over twenty years and two separate lawsuits illustrates one
way that this form of injunction death can unfold.
The story begins in 1980, when individuals with mobility
impairments filed Heyer v. New York City Housing Authority,
challenging the public housing authority's failure to provide
reasonable accommodations. 14 7 The district court certified a class, 148

145. See supra Part II.B.
146. See, e.g., Sarah N. Welling & Barbara W. Jones, Prison Reform Issues for the Eighties:
Modification and Dissolution of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 20 CONN. L. REV. 865, 886
(1988) (noting that some institutional reform injunctions "just lapse into a dormant state from
lack of attention"). It is possible that such injunctions can be revived after years of dormancy.
See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics,
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 215 (2013) (discussing the potential revival of "orphan" prisonerrights decrees following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011)).
This Section, however, is focused on injunctions that effectively terminate due to disuse.
147. Complaint, Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
1980). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Housing Authority failed to
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and, in 1982, so-ordered a settlement agreement that required the
defendant to take certain remedial steps under the supervision of the
district court. 149 The Heyer settlement had no termination provision,
but at some point it fell into disuse.15 0 This became apparent in 2002,
when a new group of plaintiffs filed Bennett v. New York City Housing
Authority, a class action challenging similar violations at the housing
authority. 15 1 None of the participants in the Bennett litigation initially
were aware of the Heyer settlement-not the plaintiffs (who were
members of the class certified in Heyer), not the government
defendants, not the lawyers for either side, and not the judge assigned
to the case. In fact, the parties fully litigated a motion to dismiss,
which resulted in a reported decision. 152 It was not until 2005-three
years after Bennett was filed-that the parties and the court became
aware of the Heyer settlement. At that point, the Bennett litigation
was consolidated with the Heyer litigation, and the parties negotiated
a new settlement agreement that was approved by the Heyer judge in
2006.153
The implications of injunction death by disuse are not easy to
assess. It may be that disuse is a sign that an injunction is no longer
necessary. An injunction may fall into disuse when both the plaintiffs
and the defendants are content with the inactivity, either because the
status quo is acceptable to both parties or because the potential
benefit of disturbing the status quo-for example, by making a motion
to enforce, modify, or terminate the injunction-creates risks or costs
that neither party wants to incur. Either way, this type of disuse does
not seem to be objectionable.
However, injunctions that fall into disuse can have
implications that are not so benign. Whether the product of a litigated
injunction or a consent decree, institutional reform injunctions set
provide individuals with mobility impairments who have been, are, or will be qualified for the
Section 8 program with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. See id.
148. Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1980) (order
granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification).
149. Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1982)
(approving Stipulation of Settlement and Order).
150. See Special Litigation Unit: Bennett v. NYCHA (2002), N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP.
(2016),
http://nylag.org/units/special-litigation-unit/monitoring-and-individual-relief-cases/
[https://perma.cc/QY9N-KYCF] (stating that the
bennett-v-new-york-city-housing-authority
Heyer settlement was "never enforced").
151. Complaint, Bennett v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 1:02-cv-03499 (CPS) (E.D.N.Y. Jun.
17, 2002). The Bennett plaintiffs brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the Fair Housing Act.
152. Bennett v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 2d 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
153. Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS), 2006 WL 1148689 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 28, 2006).
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forth what the government defendant is required to do. Yet as these
injunctions age and their viability is eroded by the passage of time,
the injunctions are becoming an unexpected source of uncertainty.
When an aging injunction falls into disuse, it becomes less clear to the
defendant whether it is still bound by the injunction. The defendant
does not know whether its actions are still governed by the injunction
or whether it will be subject to a contempt or enforcement motion for
failing to comply. The injunction's beneficiaries are similarly left in
the dark: they do not know whether the injunction continues to be a
source of rights or whether they can challenge the defendant's
violations of those rights by enforcing the terms of the injunction.
Injunctions that effectively end due to disuse also raise
concerns about the allocation of institutional reform litigation
resources. When an injunction fades away, the violations that gave
rise to the underlying lawsuit may resume in the future. In such
instances, rather than using the old injunction to challenge the
violations, new plaintiffs must bring a new lawsuit. Such litigation
occurs on a clean slate, requiring the parties and the judge to expend
resources that were already spent as part of the earlier lawsuit and
would have been avoided had the earlier injunction remained active.
Death by disuse can also raise distributive justice concerns.
Preventing an institutional reform injunction from falling into disuse
is largely the job of the plaintiffs. Unless the plaintiffs monitor the
defendant's compliance with the injunction and seek to enforce the
injunction when noncompliance becomes apparent, an injunction is
likely to become inactive. Such vigilance requires the expenditure of
legal resources well after the injunction has been secured. As
discussed above, plaintiffs in institutional reform litigation typically
have limited access to legal resources, meaning that they have less
capacity to vigilantly police their injunctions than plaintiffs who win
injunctions in other types of lawsuits. Thus, injunction death by
disuse is likely to disproportionately prejudice low-income plaintiffs
who rely on overburdened and under-resourced public interest
lawyers.
Finally, there is also a less obvious consequence to injunction
death by disuse: the impact on the rule of law. Until a judge
affirmatively terminates an institutional reform injunction, the
injunction is a court order that creates legally binding obligations. But
when institutional reform injunctions lapse into dormancy, the legal
force of these injunctions is cast into doubt even though the
injunction-at least on paper-is as binding as it was on the day it
was issued. In this way, an otherwise valid court order can lose its
power without any action from the court. And, consequently,
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defendants can defy the injunction without fear of sanction. Thus,
death by disuse renders institutional reform injunctions more
vulnerable to disrespect and disregard than other court orders that
similarly remain on the books for years after they are issued by a
court.
III. THE FUTURE OF AGING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS

As time marches on, a growing number of aging institutional
reform injunctions will predictably come to an end. As has been the
case thus far, the parties and judges involved with institutional
reform lawsuits will struggle with determining how and when the
injunctions should be terminated. Part II of this Article surveyed the
current state of institutional reform injunction death, cataloguing
three different ways in which these injunctions are ending. It also
suggested that even though each form of termination has a similar
result-the injunction is no longer in force-they have different
implications for institutional reform litigation.
This Part shifts the focus to the future: it considers the fate of
institutional reform injunctions that are currently in force as well as
those injunctions that have yet to come into existence. Section A
argues that now is the time to move away from the often haphazard
termination of injunctions, and to think more explicitly about when
and how institutional reform injunctions should end. Then, Section B
and Section C explore two moments in the course of institutional
reform litigation in which the issue of injunction death is vital. The
first is when an injunction is in force but in danger of termination, and
the second is when the parties or the judge are designing a new
injunction. In sum, by drawing on relevant doctrine and recent
experience with aging injunctions, Part III offers a roadmap for the
end stages of institutional reform litigation that is consistent with the
goals and limitations of this important and enduring form of litigation.
A. Reconsidering the Death of Institutional Reform Injunctions
By any measure, institutional reform litigation has received its
fair share of scrutiny during the sixty years since Brown II.154 Yet
scholars have paid comparatively little attention to the end stages of
institutional reform injunctions, focusing instead on foundational
questions concerning the legitimacy and effectiveness of this form of

154. See supra Part I.
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litigation. 15 5 Nonetheless, injunction death is an essential part of the
institutional reform story, and the number of cases to reach that final
stage only grows with time.
All participants in institutional reform litigation-the parties,
the lawyers, and the judges-must at some point grapple with the end
of the litigation. It is easy to overlook or postpone end-stage planning
in favor of focusing on the design and implementation of an
injunction's substantive provisions. But, ultimately, when and under
what conditions the injunction terminates may be as vital to the goals
of the litigation as other, more substantive aspects of the remedy.
Indeed, the parties in institutional reform litigation ignore
injunction death at their own peril. As the discussion in Part II
illustrates, how an injunction ends can have significant implications
for the participants in the underlying litigation. Yet despite the
seemingly haphazard ways that institutional reform injunctions often
come to an end, when and how an injunction dissolves need not be left
to the whims of fate. By preparing for that eventual outcome at earlier
stages of the litigation, parties and judges can increase the likelihood
that an injunction is terminated at the appropriate time and in an
appropriate manner. 156
Looking ahead, the lessons of past injunction terminations offer
useful guidance for both the termination of existing injunctions and
the design of future injunctions. For injunctions that are already in
place, the challenge is to prevent them from being terminated before.
their goals have been achieved. This can involve identifying aging
injunctions to ensure that they do not fall into disuse, carefully
applying Supreme Court case law on the standard for motions to
terminate institutional reform injunctions, and reviving a truly
flexible understanding of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For future injunctions, this effort can include design
innovations that establish, at the outset, when and how the injunction
should terminate and the monitoring and reporting that will be used
to trigger termination. Taken together, these efforts can help ensure
that institutional reform injunctions are not terminated before their
objectives have been achieved.

155. See supra Part I.C.
156. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 41, at 350 (observing that participants in institutional
reform litigation "have become acutely aware of the need to clarify the conditions for terminating
jurisdiction at the time the order is crafted").
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B. Avoiding PrematureDeath of Existing Injunctions
Institutional reform injunctions that are currently in force can
seem to be under constant threat of termination. Rule 60(b) enables
government defendants to file termination motions at any time, and
the Supreme Court's recent approach to these motions has increased
the likelihood that lower courts will grant them. 15 7 But Rule 60(b)
allows for more than just dissolution of court orders, and the Supreme
Court has declined to bar institutional reform injunctions despite
ample opportunities to do so. 15 8 Thus, even though institutional reform
injunctions appear to be under siege, premature death can be
prevented by, for example, carefully applying the Supreme Court's
Rule 60(b) precedents, pursuing truly flexible Rule 60(b) relief, and
ensuring that aging injunctions are not forgotten.
1. Careful Application of the Supreme Court's Rule 60(b) Precedents
For institutional reform injunctions that face termination
pursuant to Rule 60(b), careful application of Supreme Court
precedent is essential to ensure that the injunctions are not dissolved
prematurely. Although the Supreme Court decided Horne v. Flores
more than seven years ago, it remains the Court's most recent
pronouncement
on the termination of institutional reform
injunctions.15 9 Because Horne is the leading case on the Rule 60(b)
standard, it is important to identify with specificity what the Court
said (and did not say) about the termination of institutional reform
injunctions.
Horne identifies three aspects of institutional reform litigation
that, in the Court's view, justify relaxing the termination standard for
injunctions arising from this particular type of lawsuit. According to
the Court, institutional reform injunctions must be easier to overturn
because they often remain in force for many years, they raise sensitive
federalism concerns, and the dynamics of institutional reform
litigation differ from those of other cases. 160 Each of these features
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 79, at 1113 (explaining that "the apocalyptic confrontation
between Warren Court 'activism' and Rehnquist Court 'restraint' never came to fruition" and
"institutional reform litigation limped on"); Gilles, supra note 64, at 156 ("[T]he Supreme Court
has not sustained any broadside constitutional challenges to structural reform injunctions;
challenges mounted on federalism and separation of powers grounds have succeeded only in
causing the Court to warn lower court judges to be mindful of state and congressional
prerogatives.").
159. 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
160. See id. at 448.
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highlights important issues related to institutional reform litigation,
but, upon closer examination, they do not apply equally to every
institutional reform injunction.
The Horne Court is surely correct that institutional reform
injunctions "often remain in force for many years, and the passage of
time frequently brings about changed circumstances-changes in the
nature of the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its
interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights-that warrant
reexamination of the original judgment." 16 1 Yet not every institutional
reform injunction challenged under Rule 60(b) fits this description. 162
It is the court's task to determine whether changed circumstances are
present in a particular case. 16 3 If such changes have occurred, the
court must then decide whether modification or termination of the
injunction is appropriate. 164 Indeed, that is what Rule 60(b)
requires. 165 Whether institutional reform injunctions, as a general
matter, "often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time
frequently brings about changed circumstances ,"166 is not relevant to
whether, in a particular case, the circumstances have changed in a
way that requires modification or termination of the injunction.
Similarly, it may be true that, as Horne states, "institutional
reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns" and that
these concerns are "heightened" when an injunction "has the effect of
dictating state or local budget priorities," for example, when "a federal
court orders that money be appropriated for one program." 167 Some
institutional reform injunctions, like the one at issue in Horne, require
state and local governments to devote substantial resources, financial
and otherwise, to remedy ongoing violations of the law. But not all do,
either because they involve only federal government defendants,16 8 or
because they do not impinge on state and local governments to a
similar extent. Lower courts reviewing Rule 60(b) motions can surely
distinguish between these types of injunctions. Thus, Horne's
generalized federalism concerns should not weigh in favor of

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion seeking to
dissolve injunction entered less than four years earlier).

163. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
164. See id.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (stating that a party may be relieved from a judgment when
"applying it prospectively is no longer equitable").
166. Horne, 557 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 448.
168. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
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termination without a court finding that those concerns are present
with respect to the injunction under review.
The Horne Court's third concern calls for closer scrutiny as
well. According to the Court, a lower threshold for Rule 60(b) motions
is necessary because "the dynamics of institutional reform litigation
differ from those of other cases." 169 As examples, the Court noted that
"public officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously
opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is required by federal law,"
and these decrees "bind state and local officials to the policy
preferences of their predecessors and may thereby 'improperly deprive
future officials of their designated legislative and executive
powers.' "170 Furthermore, the Court explained that "[w]here 'state and
local officials .

.

. inherit overbroad or outdated consent decrees that

limit their ability to respond to the priorities and concerns of their
constituents,' they are constrained in their ability to fulfill their duties
as democratically-elected officials." 171 Again, while it may be true that
these "dynamics" are present in some cases, even the Horne majority
acknowledged that not all (or even most) institutional reform
injunctions raise these concerns. 172 Moreover, it is far from clear that
the Court's concerns about policy entrenchment and collusion are as
unusual or troubling as the Court suggests. 173 In any event, rather
than accept these broad characterizations as grounds for dissolving
institutional reform injunctions under Rule 60(b), lower courts must
determine whether the injunction at issue in fact raises the types of
concerns identified by the Horne Court.
Thus, not all of the concerns identified in Horne are present in
all institutional reform cases. It is therefore the task of the lower
169. Horne, 557 U.S. at 448.
170. Id. at 449 (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004)).
171. Id. (quoting American Legislative Exchange Council, Resolution on the Federal
Consent Decree Fairness Act (2006), App. to Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council et
al. as Amici Curiae la-4a).
172. See id. at 448 ("[P]ublic officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously
opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is required by federal law." (emphasis added)); id. at
449 (institutional reform injunctions that "bind state and local officials to the policy preferences
of their predecessors . . . may thereby 'improperly deprive future officials of their designated
legislative and executive powers'" (emphasis added) (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 441)).
173. As Justice Breyer observed in dissent, the Horne majority's discussion of institutional
reform litigation "reflects one side of a scholarly debate about how courts should properly handle
decrees in 'institutional reform litigation.'" Id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting). More specifically,
with respect to the majority's concerns about institutional reform injunctions limiting
government officials' ability to change or adopt new policies, such policy entrenchment is neither
uncommon for government officials nor necessarily a reason to overturn such injunctions. See,

e.g., Zaring, supra note 26, at 1033-34 ("To be sure, consent decrees permit elected officials to
bind their successors, but the same is true of any contract with lock-in effects. By providing
stability and certainty, consent decrees need not necessarily always be pernicious.").
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courts adjudicating Rule 60(b) motions to find whether and to what
extent the concerns are present in the particular case under review. If,
as the majority found in Horne, all three are present, then a more
flexible approach to termination may be warranted. 174 However, if a
motion to terminate is based on nothing more than a defendant's
invocation of one or more of the concerns identified in Horne, the court
should apply the normal Rule 60(b) standard. 175
In addition to scrutinizing what Horne did say, it is important
to note what the Court did not say. The Court did not disturb its prior
holdings concerning the scope of consent decrees in institutional
reform litigation. Horne involved an injunction issued by the district
court based on its findings that the defendants had violated the law.
In reviewing the injunction, the Court relied on prior decisions holding
that litigated injunctions cannot order the defendant to do more than
federal law requires. 176 Horne left undisturbed the Court's longstanding view that a consent decree-unlike a litigated decree-can
compel an institutional reform defendant to do more than is required
by law. 177 Thus, Horne's demand for a seamless fit between the

174. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 447-51.
175. The Second Circuit rejected such an argument in United States ex rel. AntiDiscrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County, 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir.
2013). There, the county defendant argued that the injunction should be terminated under Rule
60(b) and Horne because members of the county government are subject to term limits and
therefore "cannot bind their successors to the obligations of the consent decree." Id. at 771. The
Second Circuit disagreed, noting that, "if accepted, it would terminate all of the obligations
under the consent decree at the close of the terms of office during which the agreement was
entered. Such a conclusion would amount to a sea change in the operation of consent decrees in
the United States." Id. The court thus rejected the defendant's argument, holding that "a local
government is not relieved of its obligations under a consent decree taken on behalf of a previous
administration merely because new local officials will and do take office." Id.; cf. Harris v. City of
Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1327 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding, prior to Horne, that "the election of a
new administration does not relieve [a local government] of valid obligations assumed by
previous administrations").

176. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (explaining that "courts must remain attentive to the fact
that 'federal court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition
that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a violation'" (quoting Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977))); see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367,
389 (1992) ("Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to
undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been
adjudicated.").
177. See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1994) ("[W]e have no doubt that ... [the government
defendants] could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that
had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires.. . , but also
more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement."); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S.
347, 354 n.6 (1992) ("[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the
requirements of federal law."); Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because
the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.").
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defendant's federal-law violation and the terms of the injunction does
not extend to institutional reform injunctions that arise from consent
decrees.
Nor did Horne overrule the Court's prior rulings concerning
when it is appropriate to dissolve injunctions under Rule 60(b).

178

Prior to Horne, the Court made clear that continued enforcement of an
institutional reform injunction is appropriate until the defendant has
implemented a remedy that is durable. In other words, a defendant
cannot escape an injunction the moment it fixes whatever problems
gave rise to the underlying litigation. For example, the Court ruled
that dissolution of a school desegregation injunction was appropriate
when the district court found that the school board has complied with
the law for "a reasonable period of time" and that it was "unlikely that
the school board would return to its former ways." 179 Although the
Horne Court did not speak clearly on the appropriate duration of
institutional reform injunctions, 18 0 its reference to a remedy that is
"durable" suggests that lower courts should not terminate
institutional reform injunctions the moment the defendant has
managed to cease its unlawful behavior. 181 Rather, as is the case with
all prospective injunctive relief, the injunctions should remain in force
as long as they are still deterring noncompliance with the law. 182

178. See Kelley, supra note 6, at 293 (observing that the Horne Court "did not explicitly
disavow prior decisions that employed stricter standards for modifying decrees").
179. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991).
180. Compare Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 ("If a durable remedy has been implemented,
continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper." (emphasis added)),
with id. at 450 ("A flexible approach [to the Rule 60(b) analysis] allows courts to ensure that
'responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its
officials' when the circumstances warrant." (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004)
(emphasis added))), and id. at 451 (criticizing the lower court for failing to "applying a flexible
standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal
law has been remedied" (emphasis added)). Not surprisingly, in the wake of Horne, "lower courts
have struggled to ascertain the standards applicable in various cases." Kelley, supra note 6, at
293.
181. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 ("If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued
enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper."); see also Evans v. Fenty, 701 F.
Supp. 2d 126, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) ("What it means to have a 'durable remedy' is a question that
Horne does not answer, but at a minimum, a 'durable' remedy means a remedy that gives the
Court confidence that defendants will not resume their violations of plaintiffs' constitutional
rights once judicial oversight ends.").
182. See, e.g., Welling & Jones, supra note 146, at 888 ("If an injunction is no longer
necessary to deter future noncompliance, it stands only as a punishment for past transgressions
and should be dissolved. Alternatively, if the injunction is still deterring noncompliance, it
should be continued.").
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2. Truly Flexible Rule 60(b) Relief
From the earliest days of institutional reform litigation, judges
and scholars understood that institutional reform injunctions needed
to be flexible and adaptable in order to achieve their goals. 183 They
recognized that the best efforts of parties and judges to create an
effective remedy could be undermined by changes in circumstances. 1 84
Thus, the parties and judges involved in institutional reform litigation
must be able to revisit and revise the injunctions to ensure that the
remedies remain in sync with current realities. Modifications could
respond to developments that render prior remedial steps ineffective,
unduly burdensome, or counterproductive in ways that were
unanticipated when the injunction was originally designed.
Rule 60(b) provides the natural mechanism for adapting and
adjusting institutional reform injunctions. As discussed above, under
Rule 60(b) a party may ask a court to modify or terminate an
injunction in certain situations, including when there has been "a
significant change either in factual conditions or in law" 185 that
renders continued enforcement of the injunction "no longer

183. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992) ("The experience
of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals in implementing and modifying such decrees has
demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform
no dispute but
litigation."); Sys. Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) ("There is ...
that a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree
if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed,
or new ones have since arisen."); N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d
956, 970 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing need for a flexible modification standard for institutional
reform injunctions); Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (3d Cir. 1979).
As Professor Owen Fiss has explained:
The judge must search for the "best" remedy, but since his judgment must incorporate
such open-ended considerations as effectiveness and fairness, and since the threat and
constitutional value that occasions the intervention can never be defined with great
precision, the intervention can never be defended with any certitude. It must always be
open to revision . ...

Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 49.
184. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1103 ("Because the injunction is necessarily a static,
presentiated response to a dynamic evolving problem, over time it almost inevitably becomes less
responsive to the problem it addresses."); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 403 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("It is the difficulty in determining prospectively which remedy is best that justifies a
flexible standard of modification."). The Court has also noted the need for modification of
injunctions in cases that do not involve institutional reform. See, e.g., Sys. Fed'n No. 91, 364 U.S.
at 647 (observing that "an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court
and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who
obtained that equitable relief').
185. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384; accord Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009).
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equitable." 18 6 For institutional reform injunctions that remain in place
for many years, such changes are common. While some changes
render the injunction obsolete or unnecessary,18 7 others call for the
injunction to be updated rather than discarded. Thus, it would seem
that both plaintiffs and defendants in institutional reform litigation
would have occasion to return to court seeking to modify injunctions
that have fallen out of sync with the facts on the ground.
Yet Rule 60(b) has become something of a one-way ratchet,
used almost exclusively by defendants to weaken or dissolve
institutional reform injunctions. This is not surprising, as Supreme
Court decisions since the early 1990s have made it easier for
defendants to escape their obligations under the injunctions.1 8 8 As a
result, defendants increasingly have sought to free themselves from
court oversight by challenging injunctions that have been in place for
years, while plaintiffs have assumed a defensive posture, fighting to
preserve the injunctions they previously won. 189
It does not need to be this way. Just because an institutional
reform injunction has been affected by changed circumstances does
not mean that the only response is to weaken or dissolve the
injunction. 190 Lower courts have broad power to modify injunctions. 191
As the Supreme Court explained in Rufo, "[T]he focus should be on
whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems
created by the change in circumstances." 192 And even when changed
circumstances render aspects of an injunction unnecessary or

186. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). As the Supreme Court has explained, "The Rule encompasses
the traditional power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances."
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004).
187. See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v.
Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) ("[I1n the case of regulatory decrees, ....
often the passage of time renders them obsolete, so that the case for modification or rescission
actually grows with time, as in Horne v. Flores. . . .").
188. See Horne, 557 U.S. 433; Rufo, 502 U.S. 367; Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); see also supra Part II.A (discussing dissolution of institutional
reform injunctions).
189. See supra Part II.A.
190. Cf. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391 (warning that Rule 60(b) should not be used "to rewrite a
consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor").
191. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[T]hough a court cannot randomly expand or
contract the terms agreed upon in a consent decree, judicial discretion in flexing its supervisory
and enforcement muscles is broad." (quoting Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64, 80 (2d
Cir. 2002))).
192. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
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inequitable, courts can dissolve those parts while leaving the rest of
the injunction in place. 193
In addition, Rule 60(b) relief is not limited to defendants in
institutional reform litigation. To be sure, the Supreme Court
decisions applying Rule 60(b) in this context have involved motions
made by defendants rather than plaintiffs. 194 However, even in those
decisions the Court has been careful to describe Rule 60(b) relief as
available to "a party" and not just a defendant. 195 Indeed, plaintiffs
have a long history of invoking Rule 60(b) in institutional reform
litigation 96 as well as more traditional litigation. 197 Regardless of the
context, courts have recognized that modification is appropriate when
changes are necessary to achieve the goal of the injunction. 198
Taking a more expansive view of Rule 60(b) relief can help
ensure that institutional reform injunctions are not undermined by
changing circumstances.1 99 Modification can be necessary when, due to
193. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992) (holding "that, in the course of
supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and
control of school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in
every area of school operations").

194. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009); Rufo, 502 U.S. 367; Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
195. See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 447 ("Rule [60(b)] provides a means by which a party can
ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if 'a significant change either in factual
'detrimental to the public interest.'

"

conditions or in law' renders continued enforcement

(citation omitted)); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004) ("Rule 60(b)(5) allows a party to
move for relief if 'it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.' "); Ruob, 502 U.S. at 383 ("[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears
the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the
decree."); see also David C. v. Leavitt, 242 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that "nothing
in Rufo limits its application to cases in which modification is sought by the defendant party").
196. See, e.g., David C., 242 F.3d at 1212-13 (applying Rufo in a case where modification
was sought by the plaintiff party); Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1996)
(same); Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Vanguards of Cleveland v.
City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
197. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968) (holding that
plaintiff could seek modification of an injunction where the injunction had failed to achieve its
desired result); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-CV-896, 2013 WL 4008758
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2013).
198. See United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. at 251 (observing that when "the decree has not,
after 10 years, achieved its 'principal objects,' . . . the time has come to prescribe other, and if
necessary more definitive, means to achieve the result"); see also Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037,
1063-64 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that changed circumstances and failure to achieve the
decree's aims both may warrant decree modification); Police Ass'n of New Orleans ex rel.
Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1996) ("It is settled that, to the
extent a decree is drafted to deal with events in the future, the court must remain continually

willing to modify the order to ensure that it accomplishes its intended result.").
199. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381 ("The experience of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals
in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often
essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation."); see also United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S.
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changed circumstances, an injunction's remedial provisions are no
longer able to prevent a defendant's unlawful conduct. This can occur
when violations continue despite a defendant's compliance with an
injunction's remedial steps, or when a defendant is wasting time and
resources implementing provisions that have become unnecessary due
to new facts and circumstances. For example, advances in technology
may create opportunities for a defendant to comply with its legal
obligations in more efficient or less burdensome ways, but the
injunction mandates actions that have become inefficient or unduly
burdensome. While district courts do not have limitless discretion
when altering a defendant's obligations under an existing
injunction, 200 using Rule 60(b) to do more than weaken or dissolve
institutional reform injunctions can be "essential to achieving the
goals of reform litigation." 20 1
A truly flexible approach to Rule 60(b) relief can also help
assuage the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Horne v.
Flores.202 If, as the Court worried, an institutional reform injunction
"locks in" a remedial approach that is later shown to be ineffective,
inefficient, or unduly burdensome, 203 the response need not be
dissolution of the injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b). Instead, a district
court could modify the injunction so that it incorporates the types of
"new insights and solutions" that the Court feared would otherwise be
precluded by the injunction. 20 4 Similarly, if an institutional reform
injunction is found to violate federalism principles as discussed in
Horne,205 Rule 60(b) relief could result in modifications that respond to
such concerns. For example, an injunction that uses a command-andcontrol approach to reforming an institution could be adjusted so that
the defendant possesses more discretion and flexibility to remedy the
unlawful conduct in ways that it sees fit. 2 06
To be sure, exposing institutional reform injunctions to more
frequent judicial scrutiny creates risks for both plaintiffs and
at 251-52 (1968) ("If the decree has not ... achieved its principal objects ... the time has come to
prescribe other, and if necessary more definitive, means to achieve the result." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
200. See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389 (highlighting the importance of preserving "the finality
of [consent decrees]").
201. Id. at 381.
202. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447-50 (2009) (discussing reasons for a flexible
approach to Rule 60(b) motions seeking to modify or terminate institutional reform injunctions).
203. Id. at 449.
204. Id. (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 442).
205. See id. at 448.
206. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1082-93 (discussing how an experimentalist
approach to institutional reform injunctions relates to areas of doctrinal controversy).
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defendants. From the plaintiffs' perspective, a higher frequency of
Rule 60(b) motions may increase the number of injunctions that are
weakened or dissolved in response to the motions. But when the
alternative is to leave in place injunctions that are increasingly
ineffective and susceptible to death by dissolution or by disuse, it is
not clear that the plaintiffs have much to lose. Similarly, from the
defendant's perspective, more frequent modification can introduce
considerable uncertainty into its obligations under the injunction.
However, to the extent that this results in injunctions that are
updated to reflect current circumstances, it may be a worthwhile
tradeoff.
3. Identification of Aging Injunctions
Premature death of institutional reform injunctions can also be
avoided by identifying the injunctions before it is too late. After all,
awareness of an injunction's existence is the first step toward
ensuring that it does not inappropriately fall into disuse. Yet even
though institutional reform injunctions are court orders, simply
identifying the injunctions that are currently in effect is exceedingly
difficult. A few are published in the Federal Supplement or in
electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, but the vast majority
are not. 2 0 7 Injunctions that were issued since 2001 may be included in
the federal courts' electronic database of court filings (entitled "Public
Access to Court Electronic Records" or "PACER"); 208 however, due to
the limitations of PACER's interface, one cannot use PACER to find
an injunction without first knowing of its existence. 209 And PACER
does not contain most injunctions issued prior to 2001.210 Thus, as

207. See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 516 ("Injunctions are court orders, so one might think
that they would be embodied in court opinions, which are accessible to and searchable by, most
prominently, subscribers of Westlaw or Lexis. Think again."); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 570
(observing that because institutional reform lawsuits "are likely to settle, they may well not lead
to any judicial decisions at all, but rather to negotiated court orders that are completely
unobservable by ordinary case research methods").
208. See PACER: PublicAccess to Court Electronic Records, U.S. COURTS, http://www.pacer
.gov (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/X8RH-CPSR].
209. See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 520-21 (explaining that someone trying to locate a
specific injunction must know the court and either the defendant name or case docket number).
This may be changing, as Bloomberg Law, a subsdription-based service for online legal research
launched in 2010, enables users to search federal-court dockets and court filings that were
previously accessible only through PACER. See BLOOMBERG LAW, http://www.bloomberglaw.com
(last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T5M9-QUAD].
210. In fact, "even now, some district courts digitize very little more than the docket sheet
itself, and such incomplete digitization used to be far more prevalent." Schlanger, supra note 99,
at 521.
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Professor Margo Schlanger has observed, "[N]otwithstanding the
individual and collective importance of all these injunctions, they
languish in practical obscurity, unavailable to all but the
extraordinarily persevering researcher who joins inside information
with abundant funds."2 1 1
Recent efforts have been made to catalogue institutional reform
injunctions, but more must be done. The Civil Rights Litigation
Clearinghouse is doing heroic work logging and making available
institutional reform injunctions on its website; however, it is not
comprehensive. 2 12 Given that the courts maintain jurisdiction over the
injunctions, they have both a substantial interest in keeping track of
their orders and the capacity to do so. 2 13 And with respect to future
injunctions, the federal courts could modify PACER so that orders
with prospective effect are tagged and, at the very least, judges are
aware of injunctions that remain in force.
C. EnsuringAppropriate Death of FutureInjunctions
The previous Section offered recommendations aimed at
preventing institutional reform injunctions that are currently in place
from terminating before their goals are achieved. This Section, in
contrast, turns to injunctions that have yet to be written and offers
ideas for how future injunctions can be designed so that they do not
terminate prematurely.
Designers of institutional reform injunctions cannot assume
that the injunction will remain in force indefinitely. Truly permanent
injunctions are increasingly unavailable to institutional reform
plaintiffs, whether because many institutional reform defendants now
refuse to enter into consent decrees without sunset provisions, or
because of the Supreme Court's apparent preference for ending federal
court involvement in institutional reform at the earliest possible
date. 214 Thus, new injunctions should address two related questions,
211. Id. at 515.
212. See Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.clearinghouse
.net (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6UAB-24JW]. As of November 14, 2016, "the
Clearinghouse is posting at least partial information on 6,794 cases, including a litigation
summary for each, as well as 49,676 dockets, complaints, filings, opinions, settlements, court
orders, and other documents." What is the Clearinghouse?, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse,
U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.clearinghouse.net/about.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/6AYK-ANF7].
213. But cf. Schlanger, supra note 99, at 521 ("There is no hope of getting the information
from the courts, which do not index their lawsuits except by a few variables, all of which are
irrelevant here.").
214. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
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namely what should trigger the injunction's termination, and how the
parties and the court will know when the triggering event has
occurred. In response to these questions, this Section recommends
termination clauses based on the defendant's performance, paired
with monitoring and reporting obligations that measure the
defendant's performance with precision and accuracy. These features
are not unfamiliar to institutional reform litigation; however, based on
the experience of injunction death discussed in Part II, as well as
important new technological developments, there are now ways to
improve the design of injunctions so that they do not terminate
prematurely.
1. Performance-Based Termination Clauses
Termination clauses are now commonly included in
institutional reform injunctions, either because the defendant
negotiating a consent decree demands it, or because the judge issuing
the injunction includes it. But not all termination clauses are the
same, and the differences can have a significant effect on whether the
goals of the injunction are achieved. Thus, when considering how to
ensure that new institutional reform injunctions do not die
prematurely, it is essential to focus on the design of the termination
clause.
Merely referring to performance of certain remedial tasks is
not necessarily sufficient to ensure that the goals of the injunction are
met. The termination provision may also need to specify that
termination is appropriate only upon a showing that the targeted legal
violations have ended. This may seem like a distinction without a
difference-after all, if a defendant has dutifully implemented the
injunction's action items, it would seem to be in full compliance and
termination would be appropriate under a performance-based theory
of termination. However, just because a defendant takes the actions
mandated by an injunction does not mean that the underlying
unlawful conduct has been eradicated. Foresight is limited, especially
as it relates to reforming complex government institutions that are
subject to ever-changing circumstances. 2 1 5 Indeed, this is what creates
the need for the types of modifications available pursuant to Rule
60(b). 2 16

215. See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1102 (describing the "baffling perplexities" that courts
encounter when they attempt to envision the future in institutional reform litigation).
216. See supra Part III.B.2.
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The distinction between a defendant's compliance with an
injunction and its compliance with the law has been held to be
dispositive by at least one court since the Supreme Court's ruling in
Horne v. Flores refined the Rule 60(b) analysis. In a recent decision by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that the
district court erroneously denied a motion to terminate an
institutional reform injunction even though the defendant had not
established that it was in compliance with the law. 2 1 7 According to the
Fifth Circuit, because the defendant had undertaken the various
action items specified by the sunset clause-and because the clause
did not refer to the defendant's actual compliance with the lawtermination was required despite the existence of ongoing legal
violations. 2 18 Although the Fifth Circuit's view of sunset clauses may
be an outlier, 2 19 it is nonetheless a reminder that performance-based
termination provisions must be linked to compliance with the law in
order to ensure that the injunction is not terminated prematurely.
In addition to performance-based triggers, termination
provisions should require some showing that the defendant's lawful
conduct is not merely a temporary or one-time-only occurrence.
Without such a durability requirement, a defendant would be able to
seek termination immediately upon satisfying the injunction's
performance goals. Yet for cases involving institutional reform, a
defendant's ability to comply with its legal obligations at one point in
time does not necessarily establish that the unlawful policies and
practices that gave rise to the litigation have been truly reformed.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this aspect of institutional
reform litigation in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,
when it ruled that dissolution of a school desegregation injunction was
appropriate when the district court found that the school board had
complied with the law for "a reasonable period of time" and that it was

217. See Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2015).
218. See id. at 329-30.
219. The Ninth Circuit, for example, appears to have taken a different approach to
terminating institutional reform injunctions in accordance with the injunction's sunset clause.
See Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that compliance with the injunction's
action items alone was not a sufficient basis for dissolving the decree). According to the Ninth
Circuit, "Explicit consideration of the goals of the [injunction], and whether those goals have
been adequately served, must be part of the determination to vacate the consent decrees." Id. at
289. But cf. Frew, 780 F.3d at 329-30 (noting that the sunset clause at issue in Jeff D. provided
that the decree would remain in force until, inter alia, "[the district court was] satisfied by
stipulation or otherwise that the claims as alleged in the Complaint have been adequately
addressed" (quoting Jeff D., 643 F.3d at 281)).
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"unlikely that the school board would return to its former ways." 220
Thus, by requiring a defendant to establish the durability of its
compliance, a performance-based termination clause can increase the
likelihood that the injunction remains in effect long enough to achieve
its goals.
2. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations
It is not enough for an institutional reform injunction to link
termination to the defendant's satisfaction of well-designed
performance goals. For a performance-based termination provision to
operate as intended, the parties and the court must be able to
determine the extent to which those goals have been met. Because
institutional reform defendants do not typically gather and publicize
information about their inner workings, 22 1 it is up to the injunction to
specify how the defendant's performance will be monitored and what
its reporting obligations (to the plaintiffs and to the court) will be.
Thus, performance-based termination criteria must be paired with
monitoring and reporting obligations that specify the data that the
defendant is required to gather and how frequently and to whom it
must be disclosed. 222
Although monitoring and reporting have long been features of
institutional reform injunctions, changes in technology have created
new opportunities for the generation of more accurate and complete
220. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991); see also id.
at 247 (explaining that a finding that the defendant was operating in compliance with the law
and that it was unlikely that the violations would resume, "would be a finding that the purposes
of the . . . litigation had been fully achieved"); cf. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 390 (1992) (explaining, in the context of consent decrees, that the legally enforceable
obligations are "not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements").
Although the Court's decision in Horne v. Flores was contradictory on this aspect of
institutional reform remedies, Horne did not overrule any of the Court's prior decisions touching
on this issue. Compare Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) ("If a durable remedy has been
implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper."
(emphasis added)), with id. at 450 ("A flexible approach [to the Rule 60(b) analysis] allows courts
to ensure that 'responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the
State and its officials' when the circumstances warrant." (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,
442 (2004) (emphasis added))), and id. at 451 (criticizing the lower court for failing to "appl[y] a
flexible standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of
federal law has been remedied' (emphasis added)).
221. This is not always true. In some contexts, the government agencies involved in
institutional reform litigation disclose information about their compliance with the law as a
matter of course.

222. Cf. Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1577-78 (2014)
(discussing the importance of data generation and data sharing when seeking to hold defendants
accountable for compliance with an institutional reform remedy).
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data about a defendant's performance. For one thing, technological
developments have dramatically reduced the burden of gathering and
analyzing many types of data that are at issue in institutional reform
cases. In cases involving agency processing or adjudication, relevant
information is increasingly digitized and maintained in vast electronic
databases. 223 While in prior years a government defendant would have
gathered that information by retrieving paper case files and
photocopying individual documents, today the information can be
made available and analyzed with the push of a few buttons. 224
In addition to reducing the burden of monitoring and reporting
obligations, technological developments can open up new possibilities
for designing performance-based termination provisions. Aware of
government defendants' growing capacity to disclose increasingly
detailed and accurate compliance data, the parties and the court can
design performance-based termination provisions that are more
targeted and nuanced than were possible in previous years. 225 In
addition, the rise of electronic databases enables more frequent
reporting: no longer are monitoring and reporting obligations
necessarily confined to monthly, quarterly, or annual disclosures, as
real-time or rolling production of performance data is increasingly
possible. 226
Requiring institutional reform defendants to undertake the
types of enhanced monitoring and reporting obligations discussed in
this Section should not raise concerns under Horne v. Flores. The
Horne Court questioned the appropriateness of federal, courts
dictating the policies and procedures of state and local institutions. 2 2 7
Monitoring and reporting obligations, in contrast, do not intrude on
the defendant's authority to operate as it sees fit and should not
trigger the same type of scrutiny.
In fact, taking advantage of these technological developments
can help institutional reform injunctions avoid some of the concerns
raised in Horne.228 For example, more detailed information about the
implementation of an institutional reform injunction can enable
district courts to make better-informed assessments of whether the
injunction is still necessary to remedy the defendant's unlawful
223. Cf. Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 314-18
(2014).
224. See id.
225. Designing effective performance metrics remains challenging, however. See, e.g.,
LIPSKY, supra note 144, at 40-53; WILSON, supra note 144, at 154-78.
226. See Parkin, supranote 223, at 314-18.
227. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448-50 (2009).
228. Id. at 447-50.
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actions. 229 Such disclosures also help the parties and the court assess
whether another concern raised in Horne-the impact of changed
circumstanceS 230-may require that the injunction be modified or
terminated. Thus, knowing more about how a defendant is
implementing an injunction is important not just for measuring the
defendant's performance, but also for ensuring that as time passes the
injunction does not run afoul of Horne.
Lastly, the information generated by an injunction's
monitoring and reporting obligations is arguably more valuable today
that at any point during the history of institutional reform litigation.
The shift from command-and-control injunctions to experimentalist
regimes means that it is essential for the parties and the court to
know which remedial actions are working and which are not. 2 3 1 In
addition, in a world in which Rule 60(b) motions are more frequent,
courts require detailed and accurate data to determine whether an
injunction should be dissolved or modified.
CONCLUSION

Institutional reform litigation cannot succeed unless its
remedies are both durable and adaptable. That is, the resulting
injunctions must remain in place long enough to prompt meaningful
systemic reform, and they must be flexible enough to account for
changing facts and circumstances. Yet changes in the legal
landscape-including, most significantly, the Supreme Court's
hostility toward aging institutional reform injunctions-have
undermined the durability and flexibility of institutional reform
injunctions. As a result, the injunctions are in danger of being
terminated before their goals are achieved.
It is not too late to correct course. Understanding the different
ways that institutional reform injunctions are ending is a necessary
first step. After all, whether the injunctions are dying by dissolution,
by design, or by disuse has varying implications for the parties,
lawyers, and judges involved in the litigation. From there, it is
possible to identify strategies for avoiding premature termination of
existing injunctions and for ensuring that future injunctions are
229. See id. at 450 ("If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of
the order is not only unnecessary, but improper."); see also United States v. Tennessee, 986 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (stating that "the Court cannot conclude that the State has
a durable remedy in place to ensure class member safety without an adequate reporting system
in place").
230. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 448.
231. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2.
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terminated appropriately. These strategies will be essential to protect
the legacy of institutional reform litigation and to ensure that aging
institutional reform injunctions are more than dusty relics from a
bygone era.

